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ABSTRACT 
The decision of the U.N. Security Council to authorize military 
intervention in Libya in 2011 was greeted as a triumph of the power of 
shame in international law. At last, it seemed, the usually clashing 
members of the Council came together, recognizing the embarrassment 
they would suffer if they stood by in the face of an imminent slaughter of 
civilians, and atoning for their sins of inaction in Rwanda, Bosnia, and 
Darfur. The accuracy of this redemption narrative, however, is open to 
question. Shaming—an expression of moral criticism intended to induce a 
change in some state practice—is assumed by scholars and practitioners 
to be a powerful force in international law generally and in the context of 
humanitarian intervention specifically. In the first study of the operation of 
shame in humanitarian intervention, this Article tests that assumption. 
Grounded both in the promise of sociological approaches to 
international law and in the reality that states cling dearly to the power to 
use military force, this Article offers insights on Security Council 
members’ responses to the dire situations that most demand their action. 
After providing a definition of shame as it applies in international law, a 
crucial piece of analysis that has been missing from this area of 
undertheorized assertions and unexplored assumptions, this Article argues 
that shaming efforts vary according to four dynamics: the influence of the 
agent of shame, the subject of the shame, the attention of audiences other 
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than the agent of shame, and the repeated interactions of the Council’s 
members. Based on this analysis, the Article suggests how states, 
international organizations, and civil society groups can best deploy the 
unexpectedly fragile tool of shame in the context of humanitarian 
intervention. In place of blind reliance on shaming sanctions, efforts 
should focus on generating the conditions that foster more effective use of 
shame as one of the vanishingly few—and thus critically important—
means of encouraging effective responses to humanitarian crises. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the last two decades, humanitarian intervention—the use of military 
force for the purpose of protecting nationals of a foreign state from large-
scale human rights abuses—has become one of the greatest sources of 
both hope and skepticism in international law. The optimists argue that 
states are internalizing norms of responsibility and the universality of 
human rights such that it is now widely agreed that no government will be 
allowed to violently oppress its own people.
1
 The skeptics take the 
position that even if states agree that mass atrocity is a bad thing, 
convincing them to act on that belief when they have no direct interest in 
doing so is another matter.
2
 At the heart of these debates is a puzzle: how 
can otherwise-uninterested states be convinced to take notice and take 
action in the face of massive human rights abuses? 
The puzzle is further complicated by the legal regime governing 
humanitarian intervention. The U.N. Charter and customary international 
law provide that a state may not use armed force against another state, 
except in cases of self-defense or when authorized by the U.N. Security 
Council.
3
 The decisions of the Council, in turn, vary according to the 
policies and interests of the five permanent members—China, France, 
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—each with the power 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ENDING ATROCITY CRIMES 
ONCE AND FOR ALL 3 (2008) (“[T]he world has at last started to . . . take the steps necessary to ensure 
that we will never again have to say ‘never again.’”); EDWARD C. LUCK, UN SECURITY COUNCIL: 
PRACTICE AND PROMISE 85 (2006) (contending that the “humanitarian imperative . . . is much more 
widely accepted now than . . . in the late 1990s”); Mónica Serrano, The Responsibility to Protect and 
its Critics: Explaining the Consensus, 3 GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 425 (2011). 
 2. See, e.g., Brad R. Roth, The Enduring Significance of State Sovereignty, 56 FLA. L. REV. 
1017, 1044 (2004) (questioning whether foreign policy can be guided by moral priorities); Michael J. 
Smith, Humanitarian Intervention: An Overview of the Ethical Issues, 12 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 63, 70 
(describing realist approaches to humanitarian intervention); Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: 
Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99, 102 (characterizing 
responsibility to protect as a “political catchword”); Thomas G. Weiss, The UN’s Prevention Pipe-
Dream, 14 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 423, 432–37 (1996) (discussing political realities of intervention). 
Beyond these debates, there is great disagreement about whether intervention—military or 
otherwise—is good policy, either generally or in particular cases. See infra Part II.D. 
 3. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; id. arts. 42, 51 (preserving member states’ “inherent right” of 
self-defense in the event of an armed attack). 
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1194 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:1191 
 
 
 
 
to veto any substantive decision by the Council.
4
 Because of this legal 
context, the question that persistently troubles thinkers in this area is how 
to convince the five permanent members of the Security Council that they 
have a responsibility to stop carnage in far-off places.
5
 
In a system of few coercive, formal means of enforcing international 
law, scholars and practitioners alike have turned to the informal tool of 
shaming—the expression of moral criticism intended to induce a change in 
some state practice.
6
 Shaming efforts seek to convince permanent 
members that they should support humanitarian intervention because of 
the embarrassment that they will suffer if they idly stand by or block 
action by willing states. This emphasis on shaming has formed part of a 
larger movement by constructivist scholars to understand states as social 
entities, and to investigate how states’ interactions with other actors—
whether states, domestic publics, or nongovernmental organizations 
(“NGOs”)—affect compliance with international norms and the formation 
and modification of state preferences, among other things.
7
 
For those who advocate reliance on shaming, the power of 
embarrassment in impelling humanitarian intervention has become 
something of an article of faith. This Article unsettles these assumptions 
about shaming by undertaking the first investigation of the dynamics of 
shame in humanitarian intervention. Examining efforts to influence the 
Security Council and the consequences thereof, I argue that shaming 
efforts affect the intervention policies of permanent members only in 
limited circumstances. By probing the contexts in which shaming 
successfully influences those policies, I offer an examination of four 
factors that affect the success of shaming—an analysis that ultimately can 
 
 
 4. See U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3. 
 5. See, e.g., INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY 
TO PROTECT 72–73 (2001) [hereinafter RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT] (discussing ways to affect 
Security Council decisionmaking); Ariela Blätter & Paul D. Williams, The Responsibility Not to Veto, 
3 GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 301 (2011). 
 6. See, e.g., David Bosco, Can Shame Defeat the Veto?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 2, 2012), 
http://bosco.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/02/02/can_shame_defeat_the_veto; see also infra Part II 
(discussing attempts to pressure Council members through shaming). 
 7. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and 
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 641, 699 (2004); Alexander Wendt, Constructing 
International Politics, 20 INT’L SECURITY 71, 71–72 (1995) (“[T]he fundamental structures of 
international politics are social rather than strictly material . . . and . . . these structures shape actors’ 
identities and interests.”); see also ALASTAIR IAIN JOHNSTON, SOCIAL STATES: CHINA IN 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, 1980–2000 (2008); Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make 
of It, 46 INT’L ORG. 391 (1992). In my examination, I do not dispute the work of those scholars who 
have produced groundbreaking theories of the socialization processes of states. Instead, I seek to 
contribute to that work by developing a thick account of the circumstances in which shaming is 
successful and the circumstances in which it is not. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/3
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lead to a more realistic, and more effective, approach to influencing 
Council members to take action in the face of massive humanitarian crises. 
The thrust of the problem addressed in this Article can be understood 
by situating it within the history of intervention over the last two decades. 
Consider the first battles of the Libyan revolution. Loyalist forces were 
advancing on the city of Benghazi, and Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi 
avowed that they would show “no mercy or compassion” to the 
opposition.
8
 Policymakers warned that without outside intervention to stop 
the impending assault, Benghazi would face a massacre, and the world 
would have the blood of Libya on its hands—the stain of another Rwanda, 
another Srebrenica.
9
 The U.N. Security Council acted quickly to authorize 
the use of military action to enforce a no-fly zone in Libya.
10
 China and 
Russia, widely perceived as opponents of humanitarian intervention, did 
not exercise or even threaten a veto to force the United States and others 
into the awkward—and illegal—position of acting without Council 
authorization.
11
 Instead, Russia and China chose to abstain on the 
resolution, voicing some reservations about the decision but not blocking 
it altogether.
12
 
Compare this to the events in the Security Council in 1999, when Serb 
security forces were escalating a campaign of violence against ethnic 
Albanians in the Kosovo region of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
The Council imposed an arms embargo against the ruling Milosevic 
regime and demanded an end to the violence,
13
 but beyond these 
preliminary measures, the permanent members were deadlocked. The 
United States, United Kingdom, and France pushed for the Security 
Council to authorize military action; Russia and China, however, refused 
to yield to their pressure and threatened to veto any resolution approving 
 
 
 8. David D. Kirkpatrick & Kareem Fahim, Qaddafi Warns of Assault on Benghazi as U.N. Vote 
Nears, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/world/africa/18libya.html? 
pagewanted=all (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 9. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya at 
National Defense University (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/ 
remarks-president-address-nation-libya; Roland Paris, Flawed, Perhaps, but Better Than Inaction, 
GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Mar. 28, 2011, at A13 (recounting warning by White House officials that 
Benghazi could be “Srebrenica on steroids” with a death toll of 100,000). 
 10. See S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
 11. See U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6498th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6498 (Mar. 17, 2011) 
[hereinafter Security Council 6498th Meeting]. 
 12. See id.; see also Michael Ignatieff, The Duty to Rescue, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 24, 2008, at 
41–43 (predicting that Russian and Chinese power “makes it unlikely that the Security Council will 
authorize humanitarian interventions again”). 
 13. See S.C. Res. 1160, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998); S.C. Res. 1199, ¶ 4(a), U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1199 (Sept. 23, 1998). 
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the use of armed force.
14
 As a result, NATO sidestepped the Council and 
launched a seventy-eight-day bombing campaign on its own.
15
 Two days 
into the operation, Russia tabled a resolution condemning and demanding 
an end to the bombing, but the measure failed to gather enough votes to 
pass, even despite the illegality of the NATO action.
16
 
Or consider the Security Council’s conduct five years before that: over 
the course of one hundred days, some 800,000 Tutsis and politically 
moderate Hutus in Rwanda were slaughtered by militiamen, soldiers, 
shopkeepers, teachers, and farmers wielding guns, machetes, garden tools, 
and kitchen knives.
17
 Soon after the massacre began, the Council voted to 
slash the U.N. peacekeeping force stationed in Rwanda from 2,558 troops 
to a meager 270.
18
 For the next several weeks, while thousands of people 
were being killed, raped, and mutilated each day, the members of the 
Security Council debated from the other side of the world whether to 
restore the U.N. presence in Rwanda. Even as they watched the events 
unfold, nearly two months passed and an estimated 500,000 people died
19
 
before the Council finally voted to authorize the deployment of a weak 
French military force.
20
 
What changed in the years between the crises in Rwanda, Kosovo, and 
Libya? It seems clear that Russia and China had not embraced a 
commitment to humanitarian intervention, which appears by the time of 
 
 
 14. See NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 261 (2000). 
 15. See Francis X. Clines, Missiles Rock Kosovo Capital, Belgrade and Other Sites, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 25, 1999, at A1; Craig R. Whitney, Bombing Ends as Serbs Begin Pullout, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 
1999, at A1.  
 16. See Susan L. Woodward, The Security Council and the Wars in the Former Yugoslavia, in 
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 
SINCE 1945, at 406, 438 (Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR] 
(describing defeat of Russian resolution, with only three votes in favor and twelve opposed); see also 
John C. Yoo, The Dogs that Didn’t Bark: Why Were International Legal Scholars MIA on Kosovo?, 1 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 149, 153–54 (2000) (noting that “[d]espite Kosovo’s . . . legal difficulties, international 
legal scholars remained noticeably, even remarkably, silent”). 
 17. See generally PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL 
BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES (1998); JEAN HATZFELD, MACHETE SEASON: THE KILLERS IN 
RWANDA SPEAK (Linda Coverdale trans., Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2005).  
 18. RAMESH THAKUR, THE UNITED NATIONS, PEACE AND SECURITY 293 (2006); see also S.C. 
Res. 912, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/912 (Apr. 21, 1994); Colin Keating, Rwanda: An Insider’s Account, in 
THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 500, 507–08 (David M. 
Malone ed., 2004) (describing negotiations leading to resolution). 
 19. See SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN 
EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 244 (1996). 
 20. See S.C. Res. 929, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/929 (June 22, 1994); see also S.C. Res. 918, ¶¶ 3, 5, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/918 (May 17, 1994); Ibrahim A. Gambari, Rwanda: An African Perspective, in THE 
UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 18, at 512, 517–18 
(noting that three months passed before for the first UNAMIR II troops arrived). 
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the violence in Libya to have become more accepted in the United 
States—at least in some circumstances.21 Nonetheless, some argued that 
the response to the Libyan revolution showed an understanding by Russia 
and China that in the face of such unjustifiable violence, to block a 
Security Council resolution authorizing military intervention would be an 
embarrassment, a shocking exposure of callous disregard for human rights, 
for human dignity, for human life.
22
 Perhaps they did recognize this—
though their persistent refusal in subsequent months to authorize sanctions 
against a murderous regime in Syria suggests otherwise.
23
 In order to 
understand not merely what happened then, but how governments can be 
influenced in the future, a deeper inquiry into the choices of states with 
regard to humanitarian intervention is needed. Opening up an area of 
undertheorized assertions and unexplored assumptions, this Article offers 
a novel understanding of the role of shaming in humanitarian intervention 
and a way forward in generating more productive thinking about this 
crucial field of international law and politics. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides a definition of 
shaming in international law. The term “shaming” is often used to describe 
how various actors seek to influence the behavior of states, but beyond a 
few cursory definitions, there has been little exploration of its meaning in 
international law. Based on a comprehensive study of the literature in 
international law, international relations, and human rights, this Part 
provides a definition of shaming, singling out the elements that distinguish 
shaming as it is understood in international law both from mere criticism 
of state behavior and from affective processes intended to influence the 
emotions of individual state actors. 
 
 
 21. Some, however, dispute whether the United States was motivated by humanitarian impulses. 
See, e.g., Andrew Leonard, Libya. Oil. War. Is It That Simple?, SALON (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www. 
salon.com/2011/03/21/the_libyan_oil_war_connection/. 
 22. See, e.g., Konstantin Kosachev, Russia’s Choice, ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA (Moscow), Mar. 25, 
2011, at 8; Yun Sun, China’s Acquiescence on UNSCR 1973: No Big Deal, PACNET (Center for 
Strategic and Int’l Stud. Pac. F., Honolulu, Haw.), Mar. 31, 2011, at 1, available at http://csis.org/ 
files/publication/pac1120.pdf. 
 23. See Neil MacFarquhar, At U.N., Pressure Is on Russia for Refusal to Condemn Syria, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2012, at A1; see also U.N. SCOR, 67th Sess., 6711th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6711 
(Feb. 4, 2012); U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6627th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6627 (Oct. 4, 2011) 
[hereinafter Security Council 6627th Meeting]. Alternative explanations for the surrender on Libya 
include theories that the United States offered to decrease arms sales to Taiwan and to advocate for 
Russia’s admission to the World Trade Organization in exchange for an abstention, see Ted Galen 
Carpenter, The Security Council Vote on Libya: U.S. Concessions to Russia and China?, NAT’L INT. 
(Mar. 22, 2011), http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/the-security-council-vote-libya-us-conces 
sions-russia-china-5057, or that—like much of the world, it seemed—Russia and China, too, had 
enough animosity toward Qaddafi to overcome their usual dedication to nonintervention, see Sun, 
supra note 22, at 1. 
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Part II explains why and how shaming has formed the core of efforts to 
influence Security Council members in the context of humanitarian crises. 
After a brief discussion of the limits of legal requirements on the voting 
behavior of the Council’s permanent members, this Part begins by 
examining early Security Council records that reveal efforts to shame 
permanent members into responsibly responding to the world’s crises 
during the first days of the Council’s operation. It then turns to three 
recent proposals—open meetings, indicative voting, and the responsibility 
to protect—that demonstrate a commitment to shaming strategies in efforts 
to change behavior in the Security Council. 
Part III argues that shaming efforts impact permanent members’ 
approaches to humanitarian intervention in only limited circumstances. 
Examining post-Cold War humanitarian crises, this Part identifies four key 
factors that impact the success or failure of shaming efforts: (1) the 
influence of the party that seeks to mobilize shame, referred to here as the 
“agent of shame”; (2) the subject of the shame; (3) the attention of 
audiences other than the agent of shame; and (4) the repeated interactions 
of the Council. This Part concludes that in light of the limits of shaming in 
motivating humanitarian intervention, proponents of intervention should 
set their sights on generating conditions for successful shaming rather than 
blindly seeking to criticize states for their opposition to intervention. It 
further contends that the dynamics of shame in the Council expose the 
breaking point of the power of humanitarianism, suggesting that advocates 
of intervention should take seriously alternatives to military force, which 
may engender greater support and less resistance on the part of the states 
with the power to realize such interventions. 
The ability and willingness of states to turn their backs on massive 
human suffering is a concern that defines our humanity. Still, this Article 
proceeds modestly. It accepts the reality of the permanent-member veto; it 
recognizes the likelihood of states’ limited interest in far-off bloodshed; 
and it urges a prudent view of the potential of military intervention to cure 
human rights problems. Some might say that this approach is too modest 
in light of the enormity of the problem this Article tackles; I take the 
position that I have chosen a modest approach because of it. Grand 
gestures of shaming have had little impact. Accordingly, the approach 
pursued here—one based both in the promise of sociological approaches 
to international law and in the reality that the use of military force is the 
power states cling to most dearly—has the potential to transform what is 
expected of the Council’s members in the dire situations that most demand 
their action. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/3
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I. SHAMING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
How to influence state behavior represents one of the core questions of 
international law. Although some formal enforcement mechanisms exist, 
they are at best limited, and most are weak.
24
 Because no supranational 
government consistently punishes or threatens to punish states or their 
leaders for illegal conduct, and because no reliable mechanism can ensure 
that states consistently compensate one another for harms they inflict, 
actors in the international system rely heavily on the diverse array of 
noncoercive mechanisms that may influence state behavior.
25
 
This informal system includes as one of its primary tools the 
“mobilization of shame.”26 Shaming has a widespread presence in the 
theory and practice of international affairs. The term “shaming” is used to 
categorize activities ranging from an NGO’s documentation and exposure 
of torture and enslavement by the Myanmar military
27
 to the adoption of a 
U.N. Human Rights Council resolution condemning those same abuses in 
Myanmar that already are widely known.
28
 The human rights movement is 
said to thrive on the practice of shaming. Ken Roth, the Executive Director 
of Human Rights Watch, describes it as “the core of our methodology.”29 
While advocates attempt to determine how to deploy shame effectively, 
political scientists theorize the processes by which shaming and other 
means of influence operate, seeking to understand how outside actors 
succeed in affecting state preferences and identities.
30
 
 
 
 24. THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED 
ATTACKS 111 (2002); OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 184 
(1991). 
 25. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 21 (1990); Oona 
Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International Law, 121 YALE 
L.J. 252, 258, 305–08 (2011). See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE 
NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995). 
 26. See generally ROBERT F. DRINAN, THE MOBILIZATION OF SHAME: A WORLD VIEW OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS (2001). 
 27. See Matthew F. Smith & Naing Htoo, Energy Security: Security for Whom?, 11 YALE HUM. 
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 217, 224 (2008). 
 28. See, e.g., Patrizia Scannella & Peter Splinter, The United Nations Human Rights Council: A 
Promise to Be Fulfilled, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 45 n.17 (2007); see also James H. Lebovic & Erik 
Voeten, The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the 
UNCHR, 50 INT’L STUD. Q. 861 (2006) (studying shaming decisions in the Council’s predecessor, the 
Commission on Human Rights). 
 29. Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by 
an International Human Rights Organization, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 63, 67 (2004). 
 30. See, e.g., MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: 
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The 
Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Despite the attention that is paid to shaming and the abundant examples 
of practices identified as shaming, there exists little analysis of precisely 
what constitutes the “mobilization of shame.”31 Indeed, use of the term has 
become so prevalent that authors and advocates seem to believe that the 
term is axiomatic and that its definition is unnecessary. Those definitions 
of shame that do exist refer vaguely to a process whereby “behavior of 
target actors is held up to the light of international scrutiny”;32 or, more 
simply, shame is identified as the “exposure of . . . noncompliance.”33 But 
what is shame? To characterize conduct as shaming suggests that it is 
distinct from some other kind of pressure or criticism, but the unique 
parameters of shaming have yet to be explored. This Part fills these gaps, 
and in doing so provides an analytical framework applicable even beyond 
the specific case of humanitarian intervention. I surveyed the literature in 
international law, international relations, and human rights for indications 
about what constitutes shaming in the views of scholars and practitioners. 
Based on that evaluation, this Part synthesizes a comprehensive 
explanation of shaming in international law. It then turns to the impact of 
shaming and examines why shaming has been relied upon despite its 
questionable effectiveness. 
A. Defining Shame 
For the purposes of this Article, “shaming” refers to an expression of 
moral criticism intended to induce a change in some state behavior without 
reliance on formal, legal processes. This Section explains the mechanism 
of shame, first focusing on the actors that shame and those that are 
targeted by shame, and then turning to how shame is expected to change 
state behavior. 
 
 
POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 1, 15 (Thomas Risse et 
al. eds., 1999). 
 31. Even Robert Drinan’s The Mobilization of Shame, a work often cited as the background 
reading on shame in international law, see, e.g., Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability 
of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints Mechanism to 
Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 462, 511 n.322 
(2004); Vicki C. Jackson, World Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 303, 313 n.46 (2006), provides 
no definition of shame. See DRINAN, supra note 26; see also Elazar Barkan, Human Rights Leader or 
Reluctant Supporter?, 4 INT’L STUD. REV. 199, 200 (2002) (“Drinan presents no comprehensive 
discussion of shame.”). 
 32. KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 30, at 23. 
 33. Ole Kristian Fauchald & Jo Stigen, Corporate Responsibility Before International 
Institutions, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1025, 1098 (2009). 
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1. The Agents and Targets of Shame 
Literature on shaming primarily identifies the main users of shaming 
tactics—the agents of shame—as nonstate actors or institutions that have 
no power to make binding law or to enforce the law.
34
 These actors have 
few tools at their disposal; unlike states, they cannot impose sanctions, 
they cannot withhold foreign aid, and they cannot initiate criminal 
prosecutions. Because of these limits, discussions of the mobilization of 
shame tend to focus on the use of this tool by NGOs, civil society groups, 
and institutions like the U.N. Human Rights Council or the Committee 
Against Torture, the decisions of which have no binding authority.
35
 
Nonetheless, governments and intergovernmental organizations with law-
making power also rely heavily on shaming to influence state behavior.
36
 
For example, the U.N. Security Council has the power to issue decisions 
that are binding on all U.N. member states, but it often uses its resolutions 
instead to express condemnation of a state’s wrongdoing.37 Similarly, 
along with the many coercive tools it uses, the U.S. government relies on 
its annual Human Rights Reports to change state behavior by exposing 
violations.
38
 Although coercive means of enforcement, such as economic 
sanctions or prosecutions, are available to these actors, in many contexts 
they are difficult or costly to employ. Shaming, in contrast, requires no 
centralized authority, and the sanction can be effective as soon as it is 
carried out, with no subsequent monitoring requirements. Shaming thus 
 
 
 34. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 29, at 67; Bill Steigerwald, Human Rights and Wrongs, PITT. 
TRIB. REV. (Mar. 29, 2003), triblive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/opinion/columnists/qa/s_126235.html 
(interviewing Amnesty International director William Schulz). 
 35. See, e.g., JULIE A. MERTUS, BAIT AND SWITCH: HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
148–50 (2004); Sarah Joseph & Joanna Kyriakakis, The United Nations and Human Rights, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1, 26 (Sarah Joseph & Adam 
McBeth eds., 2010). 
 36. See Leonard S. Rubenstein, How International Human Rights Organizations Can Advance 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A Response to Kenneth Roth, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 845, 848 
(2004); see also THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS: PAPERS OF A CONFERENCE OF 
THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE 447–
56 (Stephen M. Schwebel ed., 1971) (discussing differences between shame by states against other 
states and shaming by nonstate actors within a country against that government). 
 37. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2014, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2014 (Oct. 21, 2011) (condemning human 
rights violations by Yemeni authorities). This may be an example of incrementally building the 
community that ultimately will support coercive action. While the Council might not expect that the 
condemnation will change the behavior of the target state, the condemnation may still serve to 
convince other states to pay attention to the violations by the target state and to support more severe 
sanctions in the future. 
 38. See DRINAN, supra note 26, at 84–94 (arguing that U.S. State Department Human Rights 
Reports are successful in changing human rights practices in other countries). 
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provides an opportunity for influence even by actors with alternative 
means for seeking changes in behavior. 
As the term is used in international law, shaming targets the behavior 
of states. The focus on states presents a crucial distinction from other types 
of shaming such as shame in criminal law, which emphasizes the impact 
of shaming on the emotions of individuals.
39
 As states are ultimately 
constituted of the people who run them, shame in international law of 
course seeks to affect the decisions of the individuals who make state 
policies. The process, however, is understood to center on those 
individuals’ positions as representatives of the state. Accordingly, with 
only a few exceptions, writers on shame in international law generally 
give no consideration to the individual government leader’s own need to 
protect her personal reputation for fairness, harshness, morality, or 
shrewdness. Similarly, in defining shame, no consideration generally is 
given to any impact that should be had on the individual’s personal 
feelings of pain, isolation, or humiliation. This limited focus on states may 
be detrimental to our understanding of shame in international law and 
international relations. When Bill Clinton, for example, apologized in 
Rwanda for the failures of the international community,
40
 this may have 
been the product of shame he felt as an individual, as opposed to his 
absorption of the criticism of the state. Still, despite the limits of this 
approach, the target of the shame—as the term is understood in this 
context—is seen to be the state itself, and it is only in the reality that 
individuals make up a state that the persons who run the state or make 
state decisions are thought to be a part of the shaming process.
41
 
 
 
 39. For a sampling of this innovative work, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM 
HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW (2004); John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing 
Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, 25 CRIME & JUST. 1 (1999); Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming 
Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733 (1998); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions 
Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996); Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully 
Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. 
REV. 2157 (2001); Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 645 (1997); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal 
Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880 (1991). 
 40. See infra note 261 and accompanying text. 
 41. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International 
Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 26–27 (“[I]nternational legal discussions about ‘mobilization 
of shame’ can be understood not in the moral sense of creating guilt among states but in an 
instrumental sense of enhancing reputational and other incentives to abide by commitments.”); cf. 
Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables, in 
GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 160, 177 (James N. 
Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992) (discussing sensitivity of individual policymakers “to the 
social opprobrium that accompanies violations of widely accepted behavioral prescriptions” and their 
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2. The Mechanism of Shame 
Shaming seeks to change state behavior through expressions of 
criticism. The content of this expression, however, has been subject to 
only limited examination. In their groundbreaking research on interstate 
socialization and acculturation in human rights law, Ryan Goodman and 
Derek Jinks situate shaming among the crucial mechanisms of 
acculturation that are “highly effective and important” in changing state 
behavior.
42
 While their theory of how acculturation generally affects states 
includes shaming among such processes, they do not single it out for 
particular examination. The same is true of the work of Kathryn Sikkink 
and Margaret Keck, whose “boomerang” theory of transnational advocacy 
networks considers shaming but does not isolate a definition of what 
shaming is.
43
 Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro have illuminated through 
detailed analysis and fine illustrations the concept of “outcasting,” which 
in part covers the concept of shaming but is broader.
44
 Other literature has 
attempted to examine the process of shaming in international law through 
the lens of criminal law, despite significant differences in the meaning and 
operation of shaming in the two contexts.
45
 I offer here three points in an 
effort to provide greater clarity on the elements of shaming as it applies in 
international law. 
First, shame relies on moral opprobrium. The tool does not consist 
merely of an expression of criticism in the sense of dislike of or 
dissatisfaction with a state’s policies. Instead, shaming entails the 
expression of moral condemnation, an effort to isolate the target of the 
shame as morally inferior and worthy of censure.
46
 Identifying a state as 
 
 
“motivat[ion] . . . to avoid the sense of shame or social disgrace that commonly befalls those who 
break widely accepted rules”). 
 42. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 7, at 641, 699; see also Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, 
International Law and State Socialization: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges, 54 
DUKE L.J. 983, 992 (2005) (discussing how acculturation can result in “public conformity without 
private acceptance”). 
 43. See generally KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 30. 
 44. See Hathaway & Shapiro, supra note 25, at 309. 
 45. See, e.g., Sandeep Gopalan, Alternative Sanctions and Social Norms in International Law: 
The Case of Abu Ghraib, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 785, 798–800; Lesley Wexler, The International 
Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Responses, and Norm Entrepreneurship: The Campaign to Ban 
Landmines and the Landmine Ban Treaty, 20 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 561, 563–65 (2003); see also 
supra Part I.A.1 (discussing differences between shaming as it is understood in the criminal law and in 
international law). 
 46. See DRINAN, supra note 26, at 94; see also Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating 
and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 369, 371 (1999) 
(defining shaming as a sanction for “violations of the moral code”).  
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diverging from the practices or preferences of another does not necessarily 
constitute moral condemnation; it might simply identify a difference that 
the wielder of criticism points out for the purpose of impelling the target to 
change its practices to align with the wielder’s preferences. Similarly, a 
failure to adhere to some practice because of lack of capacity typically 
does not invite shaming. For example, Eric Rosand asserts that in order to 
shame states that do not comply with the Security Council’s antiterrorism 
sanctions regime, the agent of shame would need to show that those states 
are in violation, not because they have insufficient resources to properly 
police assets freezes or travel bans, but instead because of a lack of will to 
do so.
47
 In this observation, he implicitly gestures to the willfulness and 
moral failure understood to merit shaming tactics in response.
48
 
Accordingly, although shaming is recognized as playing a role in a diverse 
range of areas in international law, including trade
49
 and the 
environment,
50
 the moral dimension of shame explains the particular 
salience of shaming in human rights law, and especially in situations of 
violent conflict or atrocity, in light of the understanding of the norms 
governing these situations as moral obligations as much as legal ones.
51
 
This observation aligns with the theory of Ken Roth, who is 
responsible for perhaps the most famous work on shaming in international 
law.
52
 Urging human rights organizations to focus their activities on 
certain types of rights, Roth argued that there must be “relative clarity 
about the nature of the violation, violator, and remedy” in order for shame 
to be an effective mobilizer of change in governments.
53
 Roth asserted that 
this clarity is necessary because an attempt to stimulate reform will be 
more difficult when, for example, a government can fairly claim that it 
lacks adequate resources to prevent a purported violation of a right, as 
opposed to a situation when it can be shown that the violation results from 
 
 
 47. See Eric Rosand, The Security Council’s Efforts to Monitor the Implementation of Al 
Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 745, 763 (2004). 
 48. See id. 
 49. See, e.g., CHRISTINE JOJARTH, CRIME, WAR, AND GLOBAL TRAFFICKING: DESIGNING 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 39 (2009) (discussing use of shaming in the Kimberly Process to 
eliminate trade in conflict diamonds). 
 50. See, e.g., Olav Schram Stokke, Boolean Analysis, Mechanisms, and the Study of Regime 
Effectiveness, in REGIME CONSEQUENCES: METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES AND RESEARCH 
STRATEGIES 87, 97–98 (Arild Underdal & Oran R. Young eds., 2004) (discussing use of shaming in 
fisheries dispute between Soviet Union and Norway). 
 51. See James C. Franklin, Shame on You: The Impact of Human Rights Criticism on Political 
Repression in Latin America, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 187, 187 (2008) (describing shaming as “[t]he most 
commonly used weapon in the arsenal of human rights proponents”). 
 52. See generally Roth, supra note 29. 
 53. Id. at 72. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/3
  
 
 
 
 
2013] SHAME IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL 1205 
 
 
 
 
malfeasance.
54
 The claim of inadequate resources, however, is significant 
not only because it makes the shaming ultimately less effective, as Roth 
explains, but also because an assertion that a state is simply unable to meet 
the needs of its people, absent some other claim of wrongdoing, is not 
understood to warrant moral condemnation. 
Second, shaming identifies a state as diverging from a communal norm, 
rather than an individual one.
55
 Shaming sanctions are used when norms or 
practices are shared by a community of which the target of the shame 
seeks to become or to remain a part. The community dimension explains 
the relative lack of reliance on shaming for isolationist states such as 
North Korea. Indeed, perhaps the most sustained discussion of shaming 
North Korea in recent years arose out of the country’s participation in the 
2010 World Cup, a communal event that seemed to offer a unique 
opportunity to express the world’s condemnation of that government’s 
practices.
56
 The community dimension might also explain the loss of 
influence by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, a body that relied 
primarily on shaming efforts but that offered membership to notorious 
abusers of human rights, such as Sudan, Syria, and Zimbabwe. Because 
the states targeted by the Commission had little interest in being a part of 
the society of states within the organization, its attempts to shame were 
meaningless.
57
 
Third, there are two distinct ways by which shaming of a government 
can compel that government to change its practices.
58
 Under one 
mechanism, the process of shaming operates by mobilizing the threat of 
some consequential sanction either by the agent of shame or by a third 
party that has the power to influence the conduct of the offending 
government.
59
 This could be a local public, which can vote officials out of 
office or stage protests to challenge the authority of the offending regime. 
Alternatively, this could be another state or an international organization, 
 
 
 54. See id. at 69–72. 
 55. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 914 (1996) 
(defining norms as “social attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and 
what ought not to be done”). 
 56. See Paul B. Stares, A World Cup Shaming, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 2010, at 40 (“[T]he World 
Cup offers an unparalleled stage for shaming and further isolating North Korea.”). 
 57. See WALTER KÄLIN & JÖRG KÜNZLI, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROTECTION 241 (2009). 
 58. I focus here on pressure aimed at a particular government in order to change that 
government’s practices, but shaming could also be a mechanism of general deterrence, impelling 
parties other than the target of the shaming from undertaking the condemned activities. 
 59. See Roth, supra note 29, at 67–68; see also ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 286 (1999) (describing the “self-interest” theory of norm compliance). 
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which would respond to the disclosure or publicity of violations by 
withholding trade benefits or imposing economic sanctions.
60
 In order to 
avoid these sanctions, the offending government changes its practices in 
response to the initial shaming, not because the government recognizes 
that its practices are wrong or inappropriate, but rather because it wishes to 
avoid third-party responses.
61
 Shaming thus results in “public conformity” 
with a particular norm “without private acceptance” of it.62 
In contrast to the externally focused sanctions mechanism, shaming 
could also operate based on its internal impact, free of any threat of 
additional sanction. Under this mechanism, the exposure of immoral or 
condemnable practices by a state reveals the hypocrisy of the offending 
government, or the inconsistency of the repressive behavior with the 
identity that the government seeks to convey to the outside world.
63
 
Calling attention to abuses compels the target state to seek, on its own, to 
rectify its practices so that they align with the state’s public image. No 
direct additional pressure from outside is necessary.
64
 At the same time, as 
discussed above, the personal experience of individual statespersons is not 
understood to be the target of the shaming,
65
 so any individual disconnect 
between the projected identity and the exposed identity appears not to be 
of concern to writers in this area, even though that disconnect may be 
crucial to effective shaming.
66
 Instead, it is the dissonance between the 
state’s exposed identity and the identity it wishes to project that leads it to 
change practices to conform to that outside image. 
Because shaming is seen as operating through both mechanisms, 
effective shaming could produce two types of changes in behavior. 
Specifically, a shaming campaign could be successful if it convinces a 
state to stop condemned practices because it accepts that governments 
have a legal or moral duty not to engage in them. Alternatively, shaming 
could be successful if it changes a state’s practices because that state fears 
 
 
 60. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing influence of the agent of shame). 
 61. See Roth, supra note 29, at 67–68. 
 62. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 42, at 992. Goodman and Jinks argue, however, that public 
conformity can provide a first step toward deeper internalization of the norm. See id. at 995–96.  
 63. See Risse & Sikkink, supra note 30, at 15; WENDT, supra note 59, at 286 (describing 
“legitimacy” theory of norm compliance). 
 64. See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE 
THEORY 71–117 (2008) (discussing reputation for compliance and other types of reputation); Rachel 
Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 231, 241 (2009) (distinguishing 
reputation from global standing); see also infra Part III.B.2 (discussing impact of shaming regarding 
norms that form the basis of states’ identity). 
 65. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing understanding of the target of shaming in international law 
as states, not individuals). 
 66. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
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that exposure of its behavior will cause it to experience some loss, even 
though it does not adhere to any belief in a legal or moral obligation to 
stop that conduct. 
From this discussion, we can conclude that shaming in international 
law is a strategy adopted by an intergovernmental organization, NGO, or 
government, whereby moral condemnation is directed at a state for its 
failure to adhere to some shared norm of conduct. This criticism seeks to 
change that state’s behavior by revealing or calling attention to its failure 
to adhere to a shared norm and perhaps threatening some sanction to be 
imposed either by peer governments or by domestic or foreign 
constituencies. Shaming is finger-pointing; the agent of shame must 
identify the target as engaging in some conduct that should be stopped. 
B. The Effectiveness and Ascendance of Shame 
1. Mixed Results 
Little scholarly work has examined the mechanism of shaming in 
practice. Those scholars who have studied the impact of shaming on state 
behavior have found mixed results. In the first global statistical analysis of 
the issue, Emilie Hafner-Burton examined whether greater protection of 
human rights resulted from exposure of political terror and political rights 
violations in 145 countries between 1975 and 2000.
67
 The regression 
analysis, which focused on shaming by NGOs, news media, and the 
United Nations, produced results indicating that the consequences of 
shaming were varied: “Governments put in the global spotlight for 
violations often adopt better protections for political rights afterward, but 
they rarely stop or appear to lessen acts of terror.”68 Hafner-Burton 
provides two explanations for this pattern. First, governments have greater 
capacity to enact and implement legislation protecting political rights, 
whereas political terror might be more decentralized and thus difficult to 
control. Second, government leaders may adjust their abuses in response 
to shaming, such that they escalate political terror to offset loosening of 
restrictions on political freedoms.
69
 
 
 
 67. See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights 
Enforcement Problem, 62 INT’L ORG. 689, 696 (2008). “Political terror” is defined as “government 
murder, torture, forced disappearance, political imprisonment, and other acts of political terror,” and 
violations of political rights include restrictions on voting rights and political participation. Id. 
 68. Id. at 707. 
 69. Id. at 707–10. 
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In another quantitative study, James Franklin examined shaming of 
seven Latin American states by NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, 
and foreign governments between 1981 and 1995. Franklin found that 
governments with close economic ties to other countries curbed 
repression, at least in the short term, after being shamed.
70
 He emphasized, 
however, the difficulty of assessing any causal connection between 
shaming and subsequent changes in government policy, in light of the 
various domestic and international factors that could be at work.
71
 
Finally, case study research on shaming suggests that public exposure 
of human rights violations can lead governments to undertake further 
abuses in order to crack down against domestic opposition, which often 
escalates activity in the wake of the shaming. Writing about the increased 
scrutiny of China’s human rights practices prior to the 2008 Olympics, 
Simon Long explained this cycle: “The world spotlight will invite those 
with grievances to try to air them. The government will do its utmost to 
stop them,” and “[t]he impact of the games on human rights is likely to be 
on balance negative.”72 Moreover, even if shaming does not increase 
repression, it may reinforce government resistance to changing practices. 
South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo warned in response to 
human rights pressure on China that “a simplistic and self-righteous 
approach to the issue of human rights could be counterproductive by 
provoking another powerful human sentiment, namely, nationalism.”73 
2. Heavy Reliance 
These few studies of shaming have contributed to a preliminary 
understanding of how state behavior may be influenced in the absence of 
direct, effective coercive mechanisms. They are not hearty endorsements 
of shaming; each recognizes the limitations on the tool’s effectiveness. 
Nonetheless, the findings offer a limited conclusion that in some 
circumstances, shaming may affect states’ practices. These studies thus 
provide an appealing basis for reliance on shaming by actors seeking to 
change state behavior in arenas in which direct coercion is not available. 
 
 
 70. See Franklin, supra note 51, at 206–07. 
 71. See id. at 192. 
 72. Simon Long, China’s Great Game, ECONOMIST (Nov. 15, 2007), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/10125763. 
 73. Statement by Han Sung-joo, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Korea, 
Vienna, June 15, 1993, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC 
REGION 220 (James T. H. Tang ed., 1995), quoted in Alan M. Wachman, Does the Diplomacy of 
Shame Promote Human Rights in China?, 22 THIRD WORLD Q. 257, 276 (2001). 
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The Security Council is one such arena. Because of the veto power, 
permanent members have the capacity to control what the Security 
Council does or does not do. Actors interested in using or restraining the 
Council seek to influence the behavior of Security Council permanent 
members, especially in the context of their decisions on whether to support 
or oppose the use of coercive mechanisms to address humanitarian crises, 
but there are no direct legal mechanisms to impact the permanent 
members. Accordingly, it should be no surprise that proposals for how to 
influence Security Council members would embrace the tool of shaming. 
II. EFFORTS TO SHAME WITHIN THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
This Part argues that shaming has formed the core strategy guiding 
attempts to change behavior in the voting practices of permanent members 
of the Security Council. The story of efforts to impact the decisions of 
Security Council members has been told many times, in histories of the 
institution,
74
 critical analyses of the prospects for reform,
75
 and studies of 
the dynamics of international organizations.
76
 This Part approaches the 
Security Council in a different way, tracing in reform efforts a focus on 
shaming as the primary instrument for changing permanent members’ 
behavior. Section A provides a background for this discussion, explaining 
the decisions of the drafters of the U.N. Charter to vest control over the 
use of military force in the Security Council and to grant the permanent 
members a veto power. Section B then examines three developments in 
the Security Council’s practices to demonstrate this reliance on shaming. 
First, uncovering original records that have been absent from the volumes 
of scholarship on Security Council reform, I bring to light attempts to curb 
permanent members’ use of the veto through shaming in the early days of 
the Council. Second, I interpret post-Cold War efforts to introduce 
indicative voting and open meetings as efforts to enable shaming of 
permanent members in the context of humanitarian intervention, such that 
permanent members would be convinced to avoid using the veto in human 
rights crises for self-interested reasons. Finally, I explain the 
“responsibility to protect” principle as a shaming effort. 
 
 
 74. See, e.g., Bardo Fassbender, Pressure for Security Council Reform, in THE UN SECURITY 
COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 18, at 341, 351–52. 
 75. See, e.g., DIMITRIS BOURANTONIS, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
REFORM (2005). 
 76. See, e.g., JAN WOUTERS & TOM RUYS, SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM: A NEW VETO FOR A 
NEW CENTURY? 19–35 (2005). 
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A. The Origins and Implications of the Permanent-Member Veto 
The Security Council was born in the wake of the Second World War 
both as a necessity and as a compromise. The horrors of the war 
demonstrated to the Allies the need for an international security 
mechanism of far greater effectiveness than the interwar League of 
Nations, which proved to be a dismal failure in collective security and 
dispute settlement.
77
 The planners of the new United Nations viewed the 
League’s inability to secure the support of the major economic, military, 
and political powers of the time as one of its main sources of weakness.
78
 
To ensure the cooperation of the most powerful states this time around, it 
was clear that they would have to be given some control over the new 
organization’s activities.79 Accordingly, the planners of the United Nations 
vested responsibility for matters of international peace and security in the 
Security Council, a smaller organ of the United Nations consisting of five 
permanent members and a rotating set of non-permanent members.
80
 
This responsibility for international peace and security was manifested 
in the U.N. Charter in two primary ways. First, the Charter empowered the 
Council to order coercive measures to address threats to the peace, 
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. The power to order coercive 
measures entailed both the use of armed force and actions not involving 
the use of armed force, such as economic sanctions or the severance of 
diplomatic relations.
81
 Reinforcing the Security Council’s power to order 
coercive measures was Article 25 of the Charter, which bound member 
states to comply with all decisions of the Security Council.
82
 Second, 
Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibited all U.N. member states from 
resorting to military force without Security Council authorization, except 
for force used in self-defense.
83
 The Council thus enjoyed near complete 
control over the use of armed force by member states. Giving the five 
 
 
 77. See LUCK, supra note 1, at 9. 
 78. See JAMES S. SUTTERLIN, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: A CHALLENGE TO BE MET 3–4 (2d ed. 2003). 
 79. See LUCK, supra note 1, at 10; Lauri Mälksoo, Great Powers Then and Now: Security 
Council Reform and Responses to Threats to Peace and Security, in UNITED NATIONS REFORM AND 
THE NEW COLLECTIVE SECURITY 94, 97–98 (Peter G. Danchin & Horst Fischer eds., 2010). 
 80. See U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1. In 1963, the General Assembly voted to expand the number 
of non-permanent members in the Security Council from six to ten and to increase the required 
majority from seven to nine votes. See G.A. Res. 1991 (XVIII), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1991 (Dec. 17, 
1963).  
 81. See U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41–42. 
 82. Id. art. 25. 
 83. See id. art. 2, para. 4; see also id. art. 51. 
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permanent members a veto power over substantive decisions of the 
Council further ensured that they could preserve their national interests, 
and thus locked in their support for the new organization.
84
 During 
negotiations of the Charter, several states attempted to eliminate the veto 
or to limit its scope, but the position of the soon-to-be permanent members 
was clear: without a veto, there would be no United Nations.
85
 As a result, 
despite significant opposition, the permanent-member veto was accepted.
86
 
Although the structure of the Security Council was largely accepted as 
progress from the last failed attempt at international organization,
87
 the 
reservations about the veto that had concerned delegates during the 
Charter negotiations persisted, and even heightened, after the organization 
began to function.
88
 Many questioned the power disparity that they saw as 
solidified by the veto, and small states in particular worried that the 
Council would fail to come to their aid because of indecision or 
disagreement among the permanent members.
89
 Accordingly, although the 
member states of the United Nations accepted the veto power as the price 
to be paid for the participation of the “big five,” they almost immediately 
began to clamor for change.
90
 
The urgent interest of U.N. member states in curbing the veto power 
makes sense in light of its considerable impact, especially in the context of 
the use of force. In other contexts, a veto or threat of veto could 
complicate or obstruct concerted action by the international community 
but would not prevent it altogether. For example, when a veto blocks a 
resolution that expresses condemnation of a particular state, or when the 
threat of a veto convinces the sponsors of a resolution to withdraw it from 
the Council to avoid a negative vote, that veto or threat of veto prevents 
the Council from expressing some position as one that enjoys the support 
of the international community. Nonetheless, individual states or groups of 
states may still declare that position on their own. Even when a permanent 
member vetoes or threatens to veto a resolution imposing economic 
sanctions by all U.N. member states against a particular government, those 
 
 
 84. See DAVID L. BOSCO, FIVE TO RULE THEM ALL: THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE 
MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 22–24 (2009). 
 85. See ANDREI GROMYKO, MEMOIRS 116 (1990); HARRY S. TRUMAN, MEMOIRS: YEAR OF 
DECISIONS 273, 313 (1955). 
 86. See WOUTERS & RUYS, supra note 76, at 5. 
 87. See BOSCO, supra note 84, at 30–31. 
 88. See infra Part II.B. 
 89. BOSCO, supra note 84, at 37; RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
CHARTER: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 1940–1945, at 716 (1958). 
 90. See infra Part II.B. 
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sanctions still could be independently and lawfully instituted by individual 
states or groups of states.
91
 Although a sanctions regime imposed by a 
group of states may ultimately be less effective than one imposed by the 
entire U.N. membership,
92
 the legal authority of states to institute those 
sanctions even in the absence of a Security Council order is clear.
93
 
By contrast, only the Security Council has the legal authority to adopt 
resolutions authorizing the use of military force.
94
 Other states might 
ultimately choose to use armed force, as NATO states did in the 1999 
Kosovo intervention. But by most accounts, undertaking non-defensive 
military action—including humanitarian intervention—without the 
authorization of the Security Council constitutes a violation of 
international law.
95
 Some commentators have taken the position that the 
Charter’s prohibition on the use of force is a dead letter,96 but past practice 
indicates that even if states are willing to violate the prohibition, they 
prefer not to do so. In the months leading to NATO’s air strikes in the 
former Yugoslavia, for example, the United States and United Kingdom 
attempted to secure a resolution authorizing the use of military force in the 
Council.
97
 Had they not seen some value in Council authorization, they 
would not have engaged in this process.
98
 Even in the case of the U.S.-led 
war in Iraq, though not a humanitarian intervention, the United States 
signaled its preference to undertake the operation with Security Council 
 
 
 91. During the Kosovo crisis, for example, the six-nation Contact Group (Britain, France, 
Germany, Italy, Russia and the United States) imposed its own sanctions against the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia. Contact Group Agrees to Sanctions, BBC NEWS (Apr. 29, 1998), http://news.bbc 
.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1998/kosovo/85808.stm. 
 92. See U.N. Charter art. 25 (requiring U.N. member states to carry out decisions of the Security 
Council). 
 93. But see NIGEL D. WHITE, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 49–50 (2d ed. 
2005) (discussing law of countermeasures). 
 94. See supra text accompanying notes 81–83 (discussing prohibition on unauthorized use of 
force under the U.N. Charter). 
 95. See, e.g., SCHACHTER, supra note 24, at 128; Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of 
Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (1999). 
 96. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, Law, Legitimacy, and Military Intervention, in JUSTIFYING 
WAR? FROM HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION TO COUNTERTERRORISM 153, 154–55 (Gilles Andréani 
& Pierre Hassner eds., 2008) (discussing views on the demise of Article 2(4)). 
 97. See Adam Roberts, The Use of Force, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR 
TO THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 18, at 133, 149–50; see also Paul Heinbecker, Kosovo, in THE UN 
SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 18, at 537, 539–40. 
 98. See Erik Voeten, The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize the 
Use of Force, 59 INT’L ORG. 527, 528 (2005) (examining the “costly” nature of unsuccessful attempts 
to secure Security Council authorization for the use of force). 
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authorization, even though ultimately it was willing to invade without the 
Council’s blessing.99 
The veto power is therefore especially obstructive when it is used to 
block authorizations of military force professedly sought in support of 
collective ends.
100
 This explains why much of the concern around the veto 
has centered on situations involving the use of force. The shifting attention 
of the Security Council from interstate wars to internal conflicts and mass 
atrocity in the wake of the Cold War, in turn, explains why concerns about 
influencing the behavior of the Security Council have focused on 
permanent members’ positions on humanitarian intervention. But why has 
shaming been the chosen method of influence? The election of this 
strategy owes itself largely to the absence of clear legal limits on Security 
Council members’ conduct in the Council.101 The Charter prescribes only a 
few general guidelines for the Council’s conduct. The Council is required 
to “act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United 
Nations,”102 and it is widely agreed that member states acting through the 
Council must not violate those jus cogens norms of international law that 
merit special deference.
103
 These requirements, however, say little about 
how Council members must or may vote on a particular motion or 
otherwise conduct themselves in the Council.
104
 
 
 
 99. See id. at 537 (discussing U.S. efforts to obtain Security Council authorization for the 2003 
Iraq war); see also President George W. Bush, National Press Conference on Iraq (Mar. 6, 2003), 
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030306-8.html 
(asserting that the United States would call for a vote on the proposed resolution authorizing force in 
Iraq, “[n]o matter what the whip count is”). 
 100. It is important to note, however, that the veto power may be not only obstructive, but also 
crucial in safeguarding against pretext. The founders of the United Nations did aim to make a resort to 
military force difficult. While we generally think of the veto as being used in obstruction of collective 
ends, it is also a tool that prevents coercive powers from being used unless they are being used 
collectively. 
 101. See Rosalyn Higgins, The Place of International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the 
Security Council, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (1970); Edward C. Luck, The Council for All Seasons: The 
Creation of the Security Council and Its Relevance Today, in SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR, supra 
note 16, at 61, 62–63; see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion 
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 28–30 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 2, 
1995). 
 102. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 2. 
 103. ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
190 (2004). 
 104. For discussion of judicial review of Security Council decisions, see Interpretation and 
Application of 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya v. U.K.), Preliminary Objections, 1998 I.C.J. 9, ¶¶ 40–45; Ian Brownlie, The Decisions of 
Political Organs of the United Nations and the Rule of Law, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WANG TREYA 
91 (Ronald St. John MacDonald ed., 1994); Tom J. Farer, Human Rights in Law’s Empire: The 
Jurisprudence War, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 117 (1991). 
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Moreover, the U.N. Charter confers on the Security Council “primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,”105 
but it does not obligate the Council to act in any particular way under any 
particular circumstance.
106
 Members are not required to convene meetings 
on a matter simply because there is an ongoing crisis;
107
 they are not 
required to issue resolutions at any particular time or on any particular 
matter;
108
 they are not required to bring resolutions to a vote once they are 
tabled;
109
 and, most important, they are not required to impose sanctions or 
authorize the use of force.
110
 Indeed, the Security Council often takes 
advantage of its discretion not to undertake any of these activities. Despite 
the Charter’s rendering of the Security Council as the world’s first 
responder to threats against international peace and security, some, if not 
all, Council members are often content to remain on the sidelines of global 
crises. Thus, because the legal requirements on the Security Council to act 
in particular ways—or to act at all—are so minimal, informal mechanisms 
are called on to shape behavior. Shaming has emerged as the mechanism 
of choice for influencing the Council. 
B. Exposure and Censure in the Council’s Early Years 
Efforts to influence Security Council permanent members’ voting 
behavior began within months of the Security Council’s first meeting. To 
convey the message that the veto ought to be used sparingly, opponents of 
the veto sought to instill in the permanent members a sense that exercise of 
 
 
 105. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1. 
 106. BOSCO, supra note 84, at 22. For sources taking the position that the United Nations has a 
legal duty in some cases to intervene, see MURPHY, supra note 19, at 294 n.25. 
 107. For example, the Council did not hold a meeting until April 2004 on the genocide in Darfur, 
which had begun in February 2003. See U.N. S.C., Rep. of the Security Council, Aug. 1, 2003–July 
31, 2004, at 6–7, U.N. Doc. A/59/2; GAOR, 59th Sess., Supp. No. 2 (2004) (describing Council’s 
initial work on Darfur). 
 108. The first resolution the Council issued on the Darfur genocide came only in July 2004, when 
it voted to impose an arms embargo against the Janjaweed and other nongovernmental entities. S.C. 
Res. 1556, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556 (July 30, 2004). 
 109. The (in)famous “18th resolution” on Iraq was introduced by the United States, United 
Kingdom, and Spain. See Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United 
States of America: Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. S/2003/215 (Feb. 24, 2003). They chose not to bring 
the resolution to a vote after France declared its intention to veto. See Elaine Sciolino, France to Veto 
Resolution on Iraq War, Chirac Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, at A10. 
 110. The requirement of mutual defense was another root of the failure of the League of Nations. 
The United States could not commit to Article 10 of the League Covenant, which required members to 
come to one another’s defense, because it would have taken away the Congressional power to declare 
war. Accordingly, during the negotiations of the U.N. Charter, it was clear that any true collective 
security arrangement would result in losing U.S. participation. See Leo Gross, The Charter of the 
United Nations and the Lodge Reservations, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 531, 546–50 (1947). 
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the veto power was a profound act of disruption that had a moral 
dimension, a choice that could expose a state to significant costs. Well 
before the “mobilization of shame” had taken hold as the watchword of the 
human rights movement, the Security Council was gripped by an effort at 
shaming.
111
 
The first move toward change came through an effort to publicize 
information about voting. The initial meeting records of the Security 
Council included statements made by delegates, along with the results of 
votes, but they did not list the states that voted for or against a motion or 
that abstained from voting. Instead, they noted only the vote count, usually 
listing the number of states voting in favor and at times also including the 
number of votes against and the number of abstentions.
112
 After six 
months of operations, however—at which point the Soviet Union already 
had used its veto power twice, to great surprise
113—the Australian delegate 
to the Security Council, Herbert Evatt, sought to make the proceedings 
more public. When a draft resolution calling on member states to sever 
diplomatic relations with Spain’s Franco regime failed to gather enough 
votes to pass, Evatt asked that the President of the Security Council count 
not only the number of votes in favor, but also those against, because “in 
the interests of the record of the Security Council . . . there should be a 
record of votes for, votes against and abstentions.”114 Since that time, the 
meeting records of the Security Council have listed the names of states in 
the voting minutes rather than merely tallying the final count.
115
 
Evatt staunchly opposed the permanent-member veto.
116
 During the 
drafting of the Charter, he had been one of the veto’s most vocal 
challengers, rallying other delegates to join his campaign, proposing legal 
 
 
 111. See supra Part I.A (defining shaming).  
 112. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 1st Sess., 47th mtg. at 378–79, U.N. Doc. S/PV.47 (June 18, 1946) 
[hereinafter Security Council 47th Meeting] (recording number of abstentions and votes in favor of 
and against proposals, but not recording which states cast which votes). 
 113. See U.N. SCOR, 1st Sess., 23d mtg. at 367–68, U.N. Doc. S/PV.23 (Feb. 16, 1946); Security 
Council 47th Meeting, supra note 112, at 378. The Soviets exercised their first veto on a draft 
resolution on the withdrawal of British and French forces from Syria and Lebanon. Although the veto 
was ultimately meaningless—the British and French delegates agreed on their own to undertake the 
actions recommended in the resolution, see INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE 
PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 155 (2d ed. 1959)—the resort to a veto 
“astounded” other delegates and Council-watchers, who had expected that vetoes would be reserved 
for rare cases in which a permanent member deemed a negative vote necessary to defend its national 
interests, James B. Reston, Russian Vetoes U.S. Levant Plan; Council Closes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 
1946, at 1. 
 114. U.N. SCOR, 1st Sess., 48th mtg. at 388, U.N. Doc. S/PV.48 (June 24, 1946). 
 115. See, e.g., id. (recording for the first time the names of states and voting positions). 
 116. See BOSCO, supra note 84, at 36. 
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restrictions on its use, and calling frequent press conferences to inform 
journalists about the status of negotiations.
117
 Even after he lost that battle, 
he continued to challenge the veto by seeking to convince the permanent 
five of the gravity of their power. During the meeting preceding the one in 
which he secured the change to Security Council recordkeeping, Evatt 
stated before the Council that the veto “puts a special responsibility upon 
those members of the Council whose single vote may veto the action of 
the rest,” and he implored the permanent members to give “very serious 
consideration” before they chose to exercise their veto power.118 Evatt 
urged that delegates should not abandon a resolution in the face of a 
threatened veto, because the wielder of the veto should have to “take the 
responsibility of doing it, not of threatening to do it.”119 In light of Evatt’s 
position on the veto, his proposal to register the voting positions of states 
may be seen as more than a mere effort to augment the details contained in 
Security Council records for the sake of proper recordkeeping. Evatt was 
seeking to challenge any understanding of the veto as a morally neutral 
act; he aimed to present it instead as a destructive power that imposed on 
its holder a responsibility to the rest of the world. He conceived of a 
decision to exercise the veto not simply as one to be guided by the neutral 
policy preferences of self-interested states, but instead as a choice that 
could be “unjust.”120 To Evatt, the exercise of the veto constituted a moral 
act that should require deliberation and should risk consequences. Forcing 
the vetoing state to bear the harsh light of publicity was part of his 
campaign against it. 
This perception of the veto as a public act of weighty responsibility 
reemerged when North Korean forces invaded South Korea in June 1950. 
The Soviet delegate had left the Security Council five months earlier, in 
protest against the continued occupation of the Chinese U.N. seat by the 
Nationalist government of the Republic of China, which by that time had 
 
 
 117. See id.; John K. Jessup, Evatt: Australian Is Conference Hero, LIFE, July 23, 1945, at 72, 74, 
76. 
 118. Security Council 47th Meeting, supra note 112, at 375; see also U.N. SCOR, 1st Sess., 46th 
mtg. at 356, U.N. Doc. S/PV.46 (June 17, 1946) (statement of Australian representative) (noting that 
“those on the Council who have been given a very special right called the right of veto . . . should 
exercise it only in the rarest type of case, and they should defer to the democratic majority of this 
Council, if there is such a majority”). 
 119. U.N. SCOR, 1st Sess., 49th mtg. at 438, U.N. Doc. S/PV.48 (June 26, 1946). Concern over 
the impact of threatened vetoes has continued today, and the Council may be influenced more by 
threatened vetoes than by exercised vetoes. See infra note 139. 
 120. Cth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 Aug. 1945, 5037 (Herbert Vere 
Evatt, Attorney-General and Minsiter of External Affairs) (Austl.) (discussing ways to curb 
“capricious or unjust exercise of the veto privilege”). 
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departed for Taiwan.
121
 Meanwhile, the Communist government had 
established the People’s Republic of China on the mainland but remained 
unrepresented in the United Nations.
122
 In the Soviet Union’s absence, the 
Security Council was able to pass a resolution that condemned the North 
Korean invasion as a breach of the peace and called on member states to 
refrain from assisting North Korean authorities.
123
 It also adopted a 
resolution recommending that U.N. member states “furnish such 
assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed 
attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.”124 
The Soviet Union quickly challenged the validity of the resolutions on 
the grounds that for any decision “on an important matter,” the U.N. 
Charter explicitly required the concurring vote of all permanent members, 
and the Soviet Union had not cast a concurring vote in either resolution.
125
 
The Soviet Union thus put forward the position that a permanent 
member’s absence from the Council was equivalent to a vote in opposition 
and had the effect of a veto. 
This argument ultimately failed, and both abstentions and absences by 
permanent members have been interpreted as concurrences throughout the 
existence of the United Nations.
126
 For the purpose of this Article, 
however, more significant than the outcome of the debate are the 
arguments deployed to evaluate the Soviet Union’s position. At the time, 
the Security Council had on several occasions accepted votes on non-
procedural matters as successful despite the abstention of a permanent 
member.
127
 Even if the text of the Charter did not wholly support this 
interpretation, abstention as a matter of practice was equivalent to 
concurrence.
128
 The new question raised by the Soviet challenge was 
whether an absence should have the same effect as an abstention or 
whether the two were distinct. Professor Leo Gross argued that 
 
 
 121. William Stueck, The United Nations, the Security Council, and the Korean War, in 
SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR, supra note 16, at 265, 266. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See S.C. Res. 82, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/1501 (June 25, 1950); id. ¶ 3. 
 124. S.C. Res. 83, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/1511 (June 27, 1950).  
 125. Cablegram Dated 29 June 1950 From the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General Concerning the Security Council Resolution of 27 
June 1950 (S/1511), U.N. Doc. S/1517 (June 29, 1950). In defense of its position, the Soviets pointed 
to the text of Article 27 of the Charter, which states that votes on non-procedural matters require the 
“concurring votes of the permanent members.” See U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3. 
 126. BARDO FASSBENDER, UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM AND THE RIGHT OF VETO: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 178–83 (1998). 
 127. See id. at 178. 
 128. Leo Gross, Voting in the Security Council: Abstention from Voting and Absence from 
Meetings, 60 YALE L.J. 209, 224 (1951). 
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abstention—a decision to be present in the Security Council chamber 
during a vote, but to not vote either in favor or in opposition to a 
measure—signaled agreement, “even if it be no more than tacit agreement 
to the action.”129 In contrast, absence—a decision to not be physically 
present in the chamber for the vote—did not demonstrate such 
acquiescence, according to Gross. Instead, he argued, absence indicated a 
refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the Council’s actions, which 
necessarily implied opposition to any measure passed during that 
absence.
130
 
In their response to Gross, Professors Myres McDougal and Richard 
Gardner focused on the necessity of physical presence in the Security 
Council to a state’s capacity to block Council action. Echoing the views of 
the U.S. Department of State,
131
 they argued that in order to veto a 
resolution, a state must “risk the censure of world opinion.”132 A 
permanent member, they contended, should not be allowed to obstruct 
global action simply by hiding; the power to defeat an effort at 
international cooperation should “be exercised in a formal, open manner, 
for all the world to see and hear.”133 Implicit in their argument was the 
notion that vetoing a measure should not be too easy, too casual, lest a 
permanent member too freely use its power in violation of the will of the 
rest of the world. 
Just as Herbert Evatt had sought to impose upon the wielder of the veto 
a sense of gravity and responsibility, McDougal and Gardner saw in the 
use of the veto a responsibility that ought to be borne by a permanent 
member who wished to enjoy such unfettered power.
134
 McDougal and 
Gardner, however, went one step beyond Evatt. In addition to articulating 
a sense of responsibility, they expressly asserted that a permanent member 
should be given the right of veto only if it was subject to the possibility of 
condemnation for exercising that right.
135
 Quite simply, if a state was 
going to veto a resolution, it should have to pay a price. 
 
 
 129. Id. at 226; see also id. at 256 (describing abstention as “tacit consent”). 
 130. See id. at 247–48, 253. 
 131. See Philip C. Jessup, The United Nations and Korea, 23 DEP’T ST. BULL. 84, 86 (1950) 
(opining that the Soviet Union could exercise its power to veto only “by taking . . . responsibility 
before the world,” not by simply failing to attend the meeting), quoted in Myres S. McDougal & 
Richard N. Gardner, The Veto and the Charter: An Interpretation for Survival, 60 YALE L.J. 258, 286 
(1951). 
 132. McDougal & Gardner, supra note 131, at 286. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. (arguing that in order to impose its will upon the Council, a permanent member must 
take “responsibility” for exercising the veto). 
 135. Id. 
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These two incidents in the first years of the Security Council may not 
be significant when looked at as isolated events. Indeed, these calls to 
recognize the moral gravity and potential for censure in the veto have been 
neglected in histories and analyses of Security Council reform. 
Nonetheless, they serve to demonstrate the early roots of the notion that 
using the veto is a decision that bears on morality, and that moral 
condemnation can and should impact the use of the veto.
136
 Over the 
coming years, however, the exposure and sense of responsibility that 
Evatt, McDougal, and Gardner sought to instill in the permanent members 
did not prevent frequent use of the veto. From 1946 to 1989, permanent 
members exercised their veto power to block Security Council action 193 
times.
137
 These vetoes were not limited to matters of vital national interest. 
Instead, permanent members were quite comfortable exercising their veto 
power on matters that were not of grave importance to them, and Security 
Council votes appeared to be yet another forum in which Cold War 
rivalries could be played out.
138
 Accordingly, when the frequency of 
vetoes drastically declined after 1990,
139
 cooperation in the Council began 
to seem possible, and advocates of Security Council reform pushed with 
new vigor to propose mechanisms to improve the functioning of the 
 
 
 136. See infra Part II.C–D (discussing reliance on shaming strategies in veto reform efforts). 
 137. David M. Malone, Introduction, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO 
THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 18, at 1, 7; see also ANJALI V. PATIL, THE UN VETO IN WORLD 
AFFAIRS 1946–1990, at 59–400 (1992) (providing background on vetoes regarding political issues). 
This count does not include votes on Secretary-General candidates. 
 138. See David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 
AM. J. INT’L L. 552, 568 (1993) (“[T]he veto quickly proved to be much more of a problem than even 
the more pessimistic of the delegations at the San Francisco Conference had probably foreseen.”). 
 139. See Malone, supra note 137, at 7. Between January 1990 and February 2012, permanent 
members used the veto twenty-five times. See Rep. of the Open-Ended Working Group on the 
Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and 
Other Matters Related to the Security Council at 13, U.N. Doc. A/58/47 (2004) (listing vetoes cast 
until April 2004); Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council, Global Pol’y 
Forum, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/102/32810.html#1 (last visited Jan. 24, 
2013) (listing vetoes cast through 2008); Meetings Conducted / Actions Taken by the Security Council 
in 2012, http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact2012.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2013); Meetings 
Conducted / Actions Taken by the Security Council in 2011, http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/ 
resguide/scact2011.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2013); Meetings Conducted / Actions Taken by the 
Security Council in 2010, http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact2010.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 
2013); Meetings Conducted / Actions Taken by the Security Council in 2009, http://www.un.org/ 
Depts/dhl/resguide/scact2009.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). This number, however, does not reflect 
the occasions on which permanent members have threatened a veto, resulting in withdrawal of a 
resolution. See Susan C. Hulton, Council Working Methods and Procedure, in THE UN SECURITY 
COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 18, at 237, 239 (“[T]he threat . . . 
of a veto may well be more significant than its actual use.”). 
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Council.
140
 Ideas on the potential for censure to change behavior gained 
prominence, as advocates of Security Council reform began a sustained 
effort to stop the veto’s reign of terror over the Security Council. 
C. Transparency and Accountability in Security Council Reform 
1. Informal Consultations 
The first efforts to improve the Council in the wake of the Cold War 
focused on opening it to greater scrutiny from outsiders. Exposure of 
Security Council decisionmaking was a natural target for reform. The 
Security Council is a secretive institution, and its processes have long been 
opaque. Especially after the enlargement of the Council in the 1960s,
141
 
Council members began to rely less on public meetings to reach decisions, 
and instead turned to private, off-the-record, informal discussions to 
negotiate positions and compromises.
142
 During these “informals,” Council 
members debated measures without any public agenda of their meeting 
and without any record of their discussions or even the topics discussed. 
After the informal consultations, they arrived at the formal, public 
meetings with positions already decided. The formal meetings were public 
performances of the scripts written during the informals.
143
 
By the 1990s, open public meetings took place less frequently than 
informal consultations.
144
 As a result of Council members reaching 
decisions outside of formal meetings, informal consultations “obviat[ed] 
the need for the veto or for voting altogether.”145 That is, if Council 
members reached a consensus position during the informal consultations, 
they could adopt that position without much or even any discussion during 
the formal meeting. If members were unable to reach an agreement during 
informal consultations, then the moving party would more likely drop the 
 
 
 140. Security Council reform received widespread attention in the 1990s, but in fact it had been on 
the General Assembly’s agenda since 1979. BOURANTONIS, supra note 75, at 32. 
 141. See supra note 80 (describing enlargement of the Council from six to ten non-permanent 
members). 
 142. BOURANTONIS, supra note 75, at 29–30. 
 143. Id. at 52 (noting that Security Council meetings “were typically convened simply to endorse 
what had been agreed upon in private”); see also DAVIDSON NICOL, THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
COUNCIL: TOWARDS GREATER EFFECTIVENESS (1982). 
 144. BOURANTONIS, supra note 75, at 52. 
 145. Juergen Dedring, The Security Council, in THE UNITED NATIONS AT THE MILLENNIUM: THE 
PRINCIPAL ORGANS 75 (Paul Taylor & A.J.R. Groom eds., 2000). 
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matter from the Council’s agenda before it reached a public, formal 
meeting.
146
 
The exclusivity of the Security Council, and frustration that its 
composition reflected outdated power dynamics, drove states to call for 
reforms such as participation by non-members in the informal meetings, 
briefings by the President of the Security Council to non-members after 
informal consultations, and announcements of upcoming informal 
meetings in the U.N. Journal, the daily digest of meetings taking place and 
documents being discussed.
147
 These efforts aimed to give outsiders a 
voice in the activities of the Security Council and were ultimately 
successful in instituting some changes, including briefings by the 
President to non-members and publication of a provisional agenda in the 
Journal.
148
 These changes are typically understood as a way to compensate 
for the absence of progress on making the Security Council a more 
representative body, the major focus of reform efforts.
149
 But there is more 
to them than that. Opposition to the Security Council’s private meetings 
originated not only in frustration with the exclusivity of the Council, but 
also in the concern that the real process of debate was off the record, so 
outsiders had a view only of the prepared statements and already-
determined positions that members presented during formal Council 
meetings. Because the real, substantive discussions happened behind the 
scenes, permanent members could not be called on to explain their 
preferences and were thus insulated from criticism.
150
 This lessened the 
 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, Recommended Measures to Enhance the Effective and 
Efficient Functioning of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. A/AC.247/5(i) (Feb. 13, 1995), reprinted in 
U.N. Doc. A/49/965 at 94, 97–100 (Sept. 18, 1995); see also Letter Dated 22 December 1997 Signed 
by Ten Elected Members of the Security Council: Chile, Costa Rica, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Japan, 
Kenya, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea and Sweden, reprinted in Report of the Open-Ended 
Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the 
Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council at 57–58, U.N. Doc. A/53/47 
(Aug. 5, 1999) (calling for greater regulation of the work undertaken in informal consultations); 
Position Paper on Working Methods of the Security Council, reprinted in Report of the Open-Ended 
Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the 
Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council at 59–60, U.N. Doc. A/53/47 
(Aug. 5, 1999) (same). 
 148. See BOURANTONIS, supra note 75, at 53–54. 
 149. See, e.g., AMRITA NARLIKAR, DEADLOCKS IN MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS: CAUSES AND 
SOLUTIONS 202–03 (2010) (describing attempts to change informal consultation system as 
compensation for the absence of real reform in the Council); see also Hulton, supra note 139, at 245 
(noting that prevalence of informal consultations prevented non-members from exerting influence on 
Security Council members). 
 150. See JOCHEN PRANTL, THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND INFORMAL GROUPS OF STATES: 
COMPLEMENTING OR COMPETING FOR GOVERNANCE 16 (2006). 
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power of actors outside of those private consultations to influence the 
behavior of the permanent members. Greater inclusion of outsiders in 
these meetings could succeed in bringing the weight of their opinion to 
bear on the Council. 
2. Indicative Voting 
Following the push for greater opening of Security Council meetings to 
outsiders, a next focus of reform was on increasing the transparency of the 
decisionmaking process—and especially of the permanent members’ 
decision to exercise a veto—during those meetings. The strongest push for 
reform of the veto from within the United Nations came in 2004, with the 
Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges, and Change.
151
 The High-Level Panel, convened to address 
how the United Nations should confront “the world’s new and evolving 
security threats,” focused special attention on the Security Council’s 
failures in the face of genocide and other mass atrocities.
152
 The Report 
took the position that permanent members should not be free to use the 
veto painlessly, as the veto demands responsibility. It emphasized that 
“[i]n exchange” for the right of veto, the permanent members “were 
expected to use their power for the common good”153 and “to shoulder an 
extra burden in promoting global security.”154 
Having established this foundational understanding of the moral 
dimensions of veto use, the Report proposed “a system of ‘indicative 
voting,’” through which Security Council members could demand a public 
explanation of all member states’ positions on a proposed resolution prior 
to a vote.
155
 The panel recommended the system as a method to “increase 
the accountability of the veto function” by exposing vetoing members to 
criticism, which, ultimately, would limit resort to the veto.
156
 As Yehuda 
Blum describes, the indicative voting system was intended to “shame” the 
 
 
 151. Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter High-Level Panel 
Report].  
 152. Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Welcomes Recommendations on More 
Secure World, Strengthened United Nations, U.N. Press Release SG/2094 (Dec. 2, 2004). 
 153. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 151, at 13.  
 154. Id. ¶ 244. 
 155. Id. ¶ 257. The Panel endorsed the indicative voting system as an alternative to a commitment 
not to veto in certain situations. See ALEX J. BELLAMY, GLOBAL POLITICS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY 
TO PROTECT: FROM WORDS TO DEEDS 21 (Alex J. Bellamy et al. eds., 2011). 
 156. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 257; see also THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE PATH NOT TAKEN 109 (2006) (explaining that indicative voting was 
intended to “expose a state’s position to public scrutiny (and criticism)”). 
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permanent member on the verge of vetoing a resolution.
157
 This proposal 
has been echoed by states suggesting a requirement that any permanent 
member exercising a veto must explain its reason for doing so at the time 
of the vote.
158
 Nonetheless, while non-permanent Security Council 
members and observers continue to push for indicative voting, the 
proposal has yet to make any progress. 
3. Security Council Reform and the Facilitation of Shaming 
These two proposals exemplify a reliance on shaming tools to influence 
the behavior of permanent members. In opening meetings to greater 
scrutiny, reform advocates seek to establish the conditions that may enable 
shaming—exposure of abuses considered to be a departure from shared 
moral standards for the purpose of changing that behavior. Indicative 
voting, meanwhile, seeks to enable other parties to criticize an anticipated 
veto before it is issued. Instead of being framed explicitly as proposals to 
enhance the capacity of actors to shame permanent members, however, 
they are justified as being rooted in “transparency” and 
“accountability,”159 concepts that have been prevalent in recent discussions 
of Security Council reform.
160
 Transparency, of course, describes the goal 
of greater exposure of decisionmaking processes, and more openness to 
outsiders. The meaning of accountability, however, is more complex, and 
indicates an insistence that voting decisions of permanent members are 
matters of responsibility and not of mere interest. 
Definitions of accountability vary, but most “emphasize both 
information and sanctions.”161 That is, accountability consists of both a 
 
 
 157. Yehuda Z. Blum, Proposals for UN Security Council Reform, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 632, 644 
(2005); see also Kemal Dervis, Thoughts on the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges, and Change, in REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY: 
PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP TO ANALYZE THE REPORT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, 
CHALLENGES, AND CHANGE 48, 50–51 (Rachel Weaving ed., 2005). 
 158. See Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland: Draft Resolution, 
Improving the Working Methods of the Security Council, Annex ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/60/L.49 (Mar. 17, 
2006) [hereinafter 2006 Draft Resolution]; Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and 
Switzerland: Draft Resolution, Improving the Working Methods of the Security Council, Annex ¶ 18 
(Apr. 14, 2011). 
 159. See 2006 Draft Resolution, supra note 158, ¶ 1. 
 160. See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 258; Robert O. Keohane, The Concept of 
Accountability in World Politics and the Use of Force, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1121, 1139 (2003) 
(proposing that improving Council transparency “would enhance the potential for public reputational 
accountability” and “enhance the prospects for publicizing inaction before it is too late”). 
 161. Keohane, supra note 160, at 1124; see also Vaughan Lowe et al., Introduction to SECURITY 
COUNCIL AND WAR, supra note 16, at 1, 39 (discussing concept of accountability). 
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“duty to give account for one’s actions to some other person or body”162 
and a possibility of being held to account for those actions.
163
 In 
discussions of veto reform, it is assumed that transparency—opening 
meetings and requiring permanent members to explain their votes in 
advance—will lead to accountability, but how this process takes place is 
left unsaid. To the extent that accountability signifies a duty to give 
account, transparency efforts such as more open meetings and required 
explanations of vote surely impose such a requirement. But proponents of 
greater transparency in the Security Council are not so limited in their 
vision of accountability. Beyond a mere reporting function, they see in 
these reforms a possibility of Security Council permanent members being 
held to account for their choice to exercise the veto. 
In this regard, veto reform advocates envision some transformative 
potential in enhancing transparency in the Council. Opening up the 
Security Council would do more than simply provide information about 
the members’ decisionmaking processes.164 It could lead permanent 
members to change their positions because of threats of censure or 
criticism.
165
 The German delegate to the General Assembly provided a 
concise explanation of this view: To allow a permanent member to veto 
without explanation “makes it easier for States to veto a draft resolution 
unilaterally for national rather than international interests.”166 Requiring an 
explanation, in contrast, “would make it more difficult to [veto] and thus 
bring about substantial progress towards using the right of veto more 
responsibly.”167 That is, if a state has to explain itself when it casts a veto, 
the potential for censure in that public process might sufficiently concern 
that state so as to deter it from ultimately casting the negative vote. 
Alternatively, the prospect of censure might convince the state to abandon 
 
 
 162. Colin Scott, Accountability in the Regulatory State, 27 J.L. & SOC’Y 38, 40 (2000). 
 163. See Keohane, supra note 160, at 1124 (“To be accountable means to have to answer for one’s 
action or inaction, and depending on the answer, to be exposed to potential sanctions . . . .”) (quoting 
RONALD J. OAKERSON, Governance Structures for Enhancing Accountability and Responsiveness, in 
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 114 (James L. Perry ed., 1989)). 
 164. Even this consequence is questionable. The proposals for indicative voting or explanations of 
a veto do not ask for any level of detail. See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 151, ¶ 257. It is 
difficult to see how these explanations would be any different from the statements already given before 
or after a vote during Security Council meetings.  
 165. See Ian Johnstone, Discursive Power in the UN Security Council, 2 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 
73, 90 (2005) (“[G]overnments who are required to announce their positions . . . will be less likely to 
cast a veto if the reasons for it are unlikely to pass muster in the court of international public 
opinion.”). 
 166. U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 8th plen. mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.8 (Sept. 22, 1999). 
 167. Id. 
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plans to veto even before the indicative round of voting.
168
 Advocates of 
greater transparency in Security Council proceedings thus imagine that 
enabling other acts to highlight or expose the moral failings of a state 
choosing to exercise its veto will lead to greater reluctance to use the veto 
and, ultimately, less use of the veto. 
D. Responsibility and Criticism in Humanitarian Intervention 
Shaming also forms the basis for one component of the “responsibility 
to protect” principle, a set of expectations meant to guide decisionmaking 
about when states and, especially, the Security Council, should respond to 
humanitarian crises. The notion of a responsibility to protect was 
developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS), an independent body formed in response to the 
challenges—and failures—of the Security Council’s responses to atrocities 
in Kosovo, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Somalia.
169
 Aiming to shift the terms of 
the debate from questioning a “right to intervene” to asserting a 
“responsibility to protect,”170 the doctrine stands for the proposition that 
states have a responsibility to protect their own populations, and that if 
they fail that responsibility, the international community, through the 
Security Council, has a duty to step in to discharge the responsibility to 
protect.
171
 In addition to setting out this dual responsibility, the ICISS 
sought to establish the conditions under which the Security Council should 
act to prevent or stop a humanitarian crisis. This framework, mirroring the 
requirements of just war theory,
172
 would require just cause for 
intervention and a proper intention by the intervenor; military intervention 
could be pursued only as a last resort; proportional means should be 
 
 
 168. See Blum, supra note 157, at 643–44 (discussing purpose of indicative voting proposal). 
These arguments must be distinguished from theories, like those in the fascinating work of Ian 
Johnstone, that the processes of deliberation and argumentation are constitutive of state preferences 
and behavior. See generally IAN JOHNSTONE, THE POWER OF DELIBERATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
POLITICS AND ORGANIZATIONS (2011). Rather than identifying a process of deliberation and 
argumentation, advocates of indicative voting and other similar proposals simply ask that members 
explain their positions, which is usually already done in Security Council meetings, either before or 
after the vote. See SYDNEY D. BAILEY & SAM DAWS, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
218–20 (3d ed. 2005). 
 169. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 5, at 2. For a discussion of the origins and 
development of the responsibility to protect, see Saira Mohamed, Taking Stock of the Responsibility to 
Protect, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 319 (2012). 
 170. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 5, at 11, 16–18 (explaining rationale for shifting the 
terms of the debate). 
 171. See id. at 17; see also EVANS, supra note 1, at 71–74. 
 172. See generally CHARLES GUTHRIE & MICHAEL QUINLAN, JUST WAR: THE JUST WAR 
TRADITION (2007). 
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employed to secure the military objective; there must be a reasonable 
prospect of success; and the intervention should be undertaken with proper 
authority—namely, authorization by the Security Council.173 The 
Commission sketched these guidelines in vague terms: The Council should 
intervene in the event of “large scale” loss of life, for example, but this 
criterion remained undefined.
174
 The Council should use military force 
only if there are “reasonable prospects” of success,175 but what constitutes 
success, and how to forecast those chances, was left to the states to 
debate.
176
 
The guidelines proposed by the Commission are not legally binding 
(though some hope that they could crystallize into a rule of customary 
international law),
177
 but instead are meant to influence permanent 
members even absent formal rules governing intervention. While the 
drafters of The Responsibility to Protect hoped that states would 
internalize these norms of intervention, they also anticipated a reliance on 
shaming: criticism by influential actors could identify Security Council 
members as deviating from a shared standard of conduct, leading states to 
change their approach to intervention in response to or out of fear of 
criticism.
178
 Supporters of this “prescriptive” component of the 
responsibility to protect intend the criteria to provide a useful standard by 
which outsiders or states within the Council can judge decisions to 
authorize or veto intervention and decisively condemn any states that are 
not adhering to the guidelines.
179
 Arguing in the General Assembly that 
the responsibility to protect would compel states to support intervention, 
Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin described the doctrine as “an 
international guarantor of political accountability.”180  
 
 
 173. See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 5, at xii. 
 174. Id. at 32–33. 
 175. Id. at 35. 
 176. See BELLAMY, supra note 155, at 85–86 (discussing indeterminacy of the responsibility to 
protect criteria).  
 177. See, e.g., Anne Peters, Humanity as the Α and Ω of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 513, 524 
(2009). 
 178. See Alex J. Bellamy, Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and 
the 2005 World Summit, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 143, 149–50 (2006); Aidan Hehir, The Responsibility 
to Protect and International Law, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: 
INTERROGATING THEORY AND PRACTICE 84, 97 (Philip Cunliffe ed., 2011). 
 179. Bellamy, supra note 178, at 149. 
 180. U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 5th plen. mtg. at 31, U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.5 (Sept. 22, 2004). 
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E. The Unique Nature of Shame in the Security Council 
Efforts to convince permanent members to support intervention in 
situations of mass atrocity have relied extensively on an expectation, or a 
hope, that governments can be persuaded to act by the force of 
international and domestic condemnation.
181
 At their core, these efforts in 
the Security Council represent typical examples of shaming—methods of 
exposing or calling attention to practices that warrant moral condemnation 
in an effort to end those practices. Shaming is distinct in the context of 
humanitarian intervention, however, because of the existence of another 
even more blameworthy perpetrator. When the Council fails to act in Syria 
or Darfur or Kosovo, it may well be viewed as abdicating a responsibility 
and thereby exposing permanent members’ deviation from the 
expectations of a community; but such sins are exceeded, or at least 
paralleled, by those of the genocidaires, the conflict entrepreneurs, the 
direct perpetrators.
182
 Accordingly, even as the deployment of shaming 
strategies in the context of humanitarian intervention might seem obvious 
or inevitable in light of the prevalence of this approach in human rights 
enforcement, the choices of states and advocates to rely on shaming is 
noteworthy, as it signals an extension of shaming efforts from first-order 
shaming—condemnation of direct perpetrators of human rights abuses—to 
second-order shaming—condemnation of the actors that are not direct 
perpetrators but that have the power to intervene to prevent or stop the 
abuses undertaken by the direct perpetrators. The following Part considers 
the outcomes of this novel extension of shaming. 
III. THE DYNAMICS OF SHAME IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
Based on the persistent reliance on shaming in efforts to influence the 
behavior of the Security Council’s permanent members, one would expect 
that this tool would have proven itself effective. Any such effectiveness, 
however, has been assumed rather than studied. Analyses of state behavior 
in this context are in short supply, and they tend to focus on the ultimate 
outcome of shaming without examining the conditions that lead to either 
success or failure. We know that the United States avoided intervention in 
 
 
 181. See Bellamy, supra note 178, at 149. 
 182. See MICHAEL BARNETT, EMPIRE OF HUMANITY: A HISTORY OF HUMANITARIANISM 236 
(2011) (describing efforts to create “something close to a moral equivalence between the perpetrator 
and the bystander”). 
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Rwanda and spearheaded it in Kosovo.
183
 We know that China and Russia 
were expected to veto military action in Darfur,
184
 a subject that ultimately 
never came before the Council. We know that they abstained when the 
Security Council authorized intervention in Libya.
185
 And we know that 
they vetoed resolutions that would have imposed sanctions, expressed 
condemnation, and called for a change in government against Syria.
186
 
Why each government made these decisions, however, has been subject to 
only cursory discussion. 
This Part examines the dynamics of shame in the Security Council. 
Based on a study of shaming efforts and outcomes in post-Cold War 
humanitarian crises, this Part seeks to provide insights on when and why 
pressure on U.N. Security Council members results in support or tolerance 
for military intervention in humanitarian crises. After considering 
preliminarily the frequency of the use of shaming efforts to influence the 
Security Council in its approach to humanitarian intervention, this Part 
isolates four factors that impact whether shaming efforts affect behavior in 
the Council: (1) the influence of the agent of shame; (2) the subject of the 
shame; (3) the attention of audiences other than the agent of shame; and 
(4) the repeated interactions of the Council. 
Three points on scope are in order. The discussion here focuses 
primarily on the behavior of the United States, China, and Russia, as 
France and the United Kingdom, it is thought, are not primary, 
independent drivers of either authorizations for intervention or vetoes in 
the Council’s decisions on humanitarian intervention. It also considers 
only post-Cold War interventions, in light of the significant differences in 
the Council’s activities and dynamics prior to 1990. Finally, as this Article 
is concerned with intervention to prevent or stop humanitarian crises, it 
limits its discussion to efforts to influence third-party states to take action 
in foreign atrocities, rather than looking at shaming intended to affect the 
perpetrators of those atrocities in the first place.
187
 
  
 
 
 183. See supra notes 13–20 and accompanying text. 
 184. Current Situation in Darfur: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 
30 (2007) [hereinafter Current Situation in Darfur] (statement of John Prendergast, Senior Advisor, 
International Crisis Group) (discussing theories about anticipated Chinese veto); WOUTERS & RUYS, 
supra note 76, at 17.  
 185. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 186. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 187. See supra Part II.E (discussing difference between first-order shaming of direct perpetrators 
and second-order shaming of third parties with the power to stop or punish the direct perpetrators). 
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A. A Note on the Use of Shaming in Humanitarian Crises 
Popular and scholarly accounts of dynamics in the Security Council 
often assume that permanent members are pressured heavily by the media, 
domestic populations, and other states to support intervention in 
humanitarian crises.
188
 A closer examination of the situations before the 
Council, however, indicates that this is often not the case. 
Television has been understood to have a powerful impact on 
humanitarian intervention,
189
 but evidence is mixed. For example, Somalia 
is often cited as a classic case of the “CNN effect”: heart-wrenching 
images on twenty-four-hour television news depicting starving children 
and widespread bloodshed purportedly captured the attention of the 
American public, which in turn pressured the U.S. government to send 
military forces to Somalia in 1992.
190
 Scholars such as Warren Strobel and 
Jonathan Mermin, however, have documented that this causal story is 
inaccurate, as media coverage of Somalia was taking place at the same 
time that the U.S. government had developed an interest in the crisis there, 
not prior to it.
191
 The same is true for the U.S. intervention in Kosovo. 
Instead of television images of horrific violence motivating the U.S. 
government to intervene in the crisis in response to public outcry, the news 
 
 
 188. See, e.g., Richard Falk, The Complexities of Humanitarian Intervention: A New World Order 
Challenge, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 491, 493 (1996) (“[H]eightened expectations about conformity to 
minimal human rights standards generate interventionary pressures . . . .”); Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The 
Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 599, 604 (2003) (noting “mounting 
pressure to intervene against . . . governments engaged in . . . reprehensible practices”). 
 189. See, e.g., Falk, supra note 188, at 493 (noting capacity of television to generate criticism of 
government inaction); Lawrence Freedman, Victims and Victors: Reflections on the Kosovo War, 26 
REV. INT’L STUD. 335, 338 (2000) (noting that the “CNN effect” is “often assumed to be the major 
factor behind humanitarianism”); George Melloan, Kofi Annan’s World View Is Not a Model of 
Clarity, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1999, at A27 (arguing that television images of violence in Kosovo 
impelled NATO’s intervention).  
 190. See, e.g., Bernard C. Cohen, A View from the Academy, in TAKEN BY STORM: THE MEDIA, 
PUBLIC OPINION, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE GULF WAR 8, 9–10 (W. Lance Bennett & David L. 
Paletz eds., 1994) (claiming that television “mobilized the conscience” of the U.S. government); 
George F. Kennan, Somalia, Through a Glass Darkly, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at A25 (asserting 
that widespread acceptance of the U.S. decision to intervene “lies primarily with the exposure of the 
Somalia situation by the American media”). 
 191. See WARREN P. STROBEL, LATE-BREAKING FOREIGN POLICY: THE NEWS MEDIA’S 
INFLUENCE ON PEACE OPERATIONS 132–36 (1997); Jonathan Mermin, Television News and American 
Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven Foreign Policy, 112 POL. SCI. Q. 385, 386; see 
also SUSAN L. CARRUTHERS, THE MEDIA AT WAR 220 (2000); JON WESTERN, SELLING 
INTERVENTION AND WAR: THE PRESIDENCY, THE MEDIA, AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 265 n.63 
(2005). According to Robert DiPrizio, the fact that George H.W. Bush was at that point a lame-duck 
president confirms that even if there was media pressure, it likely did not play into the decision. See 
ROBERT C. DIPRIZIO, ARMED HUMANITARIANS: U.S. INTERVENTIONS FROM NORTHERN IRAQ TO 
KOSOVO 148 (2002). 
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media devoted extensive coverage to the conflict only after the U.S. 
government was already becoming involved.
192
 
In some cases, an absence of shaming efforts targeting inaction has 
confirmed a government’s decision not to intervene. During the Rwandan 
genocide, U.S. policymakers kept an eye on public attitudes toward the 
lack of involvement by the United States and United Nations, but no 
significant public criticism arose regarding the morality of the U.S. 
inaction (or, for that matter, the policy implications of the U.S. 
approach).
193
 Instead, many observers expressed agreement with the 
decision not to intervene in the genocide. The Washington Post opined 
that “not much” could be done, conceding that “in a world of limited 
political and economic resources . . . Rwanda is in an unpreferred 
class.”194 Similarly, the New York Times took the position that because 
there was no U.N. force that could deploy quickly enough to respond to 
such emergencies, “the world has little choice but to stand aside and hope 
for the best.”195 It was only after the genocide that observers came to 
vocally denounce U.S. inaction.
196
 
It is also typically assumed that when the Security Council is divided in 
its approach to a humanitarian crisis, the state supporting intervention—
usually the United States—attempts to shame those states opposing 
intervention—usually Russia and China—for enabling the continuation of 
the crisis.
197
 This narrative predominates in accounts of battles between the 
United States and China over intervention in Darfur.
198
 Although China 
did consistently seek to weaken any Security Council action against the 
Sudanese government,
199
 during much of the worst violence in Darfur, the 
U.S. government was not attempting to shame China into accepting deeper 
 
 
 192. See Steven Livingston, Media Coverage of the War: An Empirical Assessment, in KOSOVO 
AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: SELECTIVE INDIGNATION, COLLECTIVE 
ACTION, AND INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 360, 368–70 (Albrecht Schnabel & Ramesh Thakur eds., 
2000). 
 193. SAMANTHA POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 373 
(2002) (noting that governments “look[] to op-ed pages of elite journals, popular protest, and 
congressional noise to gauge public interest” in intervention). 
 194. Editorial, One, Two, Many Rwandas?, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1994, at C6. 
 195. Editorial, Cold Choices in Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1994, at A24. 
 196. POWER, supra note 193, at 374. 
 197. See, e.g., Gary J. Bass, Human Rights Last, FOREIGN POL’Y, Mar./Apr. 2011, at 81. 
 198. See, e.g., id. at 83; Bruce W. Jentleson, Yet Again: Humanitarian Intervention and the 
Challenges of “Never Again,” in LEASHING THE DOGS OF WAR 277, 288 (Chester A. Crocker et al. 
eds., 2007). 
 199. See, e.g., JAMES TRAUB, THE BEST INTENTIONS: KOFI ANNAN AND THE UN IN THE ERA OF 
AMERICAN WORLD POWER 220 (2006); Ian Taylor, The People’s Republic of China, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF MASS ATROCITIES: THE CASE OF DARFUR 176, 180 (David R. Black & 
Paul D. Williams eds., 2010).  
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U.N. involvement. Instead of pushing China and condemning its tolerance 
of the atrocities taking place, the United States acquiesced in China’s 
demands for greater leniency. Washington chose this approach in hopes 
that China would use its leverage with the Sudanese government to 
pressure Khartoum into accepting the deployment of a U.N. peacekeeping 
force to Darfur.
200
 Indeed, because of the U.S. government’s judgment that 
it needed China’s cooperation in order for any progress to be made in 
resolving the conflict, it in fact sought to deflect criticisms of China’s 
policy on Darfur. 
For example, during his term as U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan, Andrew 
Natsios repeatedly called attention to Chinese efforts to seek peace in 
Darfur, while behind the scenes the United States was relying on China to 
convince the Sudanese government to accept deployment of a U.N. 
peacekeeping force.
201
 During a January 2007 visit to China, for example, 
Natsios told reporters that the Chinese were “engaging much more 
aggressively” with the Sudanese leadership to resolve the conflict in 
Darfur.
202
 Even when Chinese President Hu Jintao proudly announced the 
following month that his government was providing an interest-free, 
multimillion-dollar loan to the government of Sudan to build a new 
presidential palace, along with an additional $104 million in debt 
forgiveness,
203
 Natsios defended China’s conduct to the U.S. Congress.204 
In a televised appearance soon after the revelation that China and Sudan 
were friendlier than the U.S. government had thought, Natsios maintained, 
“I still think [China] can be helpful” and insisted that “the Chinese can 
play an important and stabilizing role” in Sudan.205 
As the violence in Darfur continued over the coming months and years, 
domestic activists who were once focused on the crimes of the Sudanese 
 
 
 200. See infra notes 201–05 and accompanying text. 
 201. See JOEL WUTHNOW, CHINESE DIPLOMACY AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: BEYOND THE 
VETO 95–112 (2013); Ngaire Woods, Whose Aid? Whose Influence? China, Emerging Donors and the 
Silent Revolution in Development Assistance, 84 INT’L AFF. 1205, 1208 (2008) (“China’s efforts to end 
the conflict and to ensure the presence of a joint AU–UN peacekeeping force have been recognized by 
the United States as very constructive.”); see also S.C. Res. 1769, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 
2007) (authorizing the establishment of the African Union / United Nations Hybrid Operation in 
Darfur (UNAMID)). 
 202. Edward Cody, China Given Credit for Darfur Role, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2007, at A13.  
 203. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, INVESTING IN TRAGEDY, CHINA’S MONEY, ARMS, AND POLITICS IN 
SUDAN 22 (2008). 
 204. See The Escalating Crisis in Darfur: Are There Prospects for Peace?: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 34 (2007) (“The Chinese were open with us. They were very 
helpful. We had good conversations.”). 
 205. PBS Newshour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast Feb. 16, 2007), http://www.pbs 
.org/newshour/bb/africa/jan-june07/darfur_02-16.html), quoted in WUTHNOW, supra note 201, at 108. 
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government began to expand their campaigns to criticize the Chinese for 
their “complicity” in the atrocities in Darfur.206 Even as this increasingly 
vocal and powerful community called for the U.S. government to step up 
its criticism of China’s ties to the regime in Khartoum, the United States 
continued to pursue a strategy of engaging China on Darfur rather than 
shaming.
207
 
Accordingly, this analysis of the dynamics of shame must begin with 
an understanding that shaming is not as pervasive in humanitarian 
intervention as many believe it is. Although humanitarian crises often 
capture the attention of civil society groups, the media, and affected states, 
in some cases it is the governments, pressured by no one, that lead the 
charge to intervention. In situations in which actors do attempt to shame 
states into supporting intervention, however, these attempts do not always 
affect state behavior. The following Section explains four determinative 
factors in the dynamics of shame. 
B. The Dynamics of Shame 
1. Influence of the Agent of Shame 
The impact of shaming varies widely according to the influence of the 
agent of shame. To the extent that domestic publics seek to mobilize 
shame in hopes of influencing governments to support humanitarian 
intervention, these domestic publics have primarily played a role in 
shaming efforts in the United States. In contrast, there has been no 
apparent pressure on Russia or China by domestic populations to support 
humanitarian intervention; indeed, these regimes claim that their citizens 
generally oppose the use of military force in human rights crises.
208
 
 
 
 206. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 199, at 182. 
 207. See, e.g., Current Situation in Darfur, supra note 184, at 30 (statement of John Prendergast, 
Senior Advisor, International Crisis Group) (urging U.S. government pressure on China); Editorial, 
Shaming China on Darfur, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/05/31/opinion/31iht-
edsudan.1.5942739.html (noting pressure on China “not from other governments but from a grassroots 
movement to shame China”); Aili McConnon, Activists Target the ‘Genocide Olympics,’ BUS. WK., 
Feb. 20, 2008, www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-02-20/activists-target-the-genocide-olympicsbusi 
nessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice. 
 208. See, e.g., Dmitry Shlapentokh, The Russian Approach to Human Rights Intervention, 
CONTEMP. REV., Mar. 2001, at 156, 156–58; Chris Buckley, Chinese “Disgusted” over Pressure on 
Darfur, REUTERS (Feb. 13, 2008), www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/14/us-olympics-darfur-idUSPEK 
27761920080214; see also infra Part III.B.3 (discussing attention of domestic audiences); infra notes 
278, 285–89 and accompanying text (discussing Russian and Chinese commitment to 
nonintervention). 
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In the United States, citizens and local activist groups are understood to 
play a role in affecting the government’s choice to support humanitarian 
intervention. Indeed, when he was asked how activists could influence the 
U.S. government’s policy in Rwanda, National Security Advisor Tony 
Lake responded, “Change public opinion . . . . You must make more 
noise.”209 But even when a noisy public has aimed to convince the 
government to intervene in humanitarian crises, public opinion has 
succeeded in pressuring the government to support intervention only in 
limited circumstances. 
Haiti offers an illuminating case study of a successful use of shaming 
by the domestic public. After Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the first 
democratically elected president in Haiti’s history, was ousted in a coup 
by military leader Raoul Cédras, the United States and United Nations 
imposed economic sanctions, including an oil embargo, in an effort to 
pressure the coup leaders to negotiate.
210
 These measures initially 
produced some concessions: Cédras agreed to the Governor’s Island 
Accord, which provided that Aristide would return to the presidency 
within three months, but the agreement quickly fell apart.
211
 
During this time, as violence was escalating in Haiti, influxes of 
Haitian migrants were attempting to reach the shores of the United States, 
and the Clinton Administration adopted a policy that none would be 
allowed on American territory.
212
 It was this repatriation policy that 
sparked the attention of the public. TransAfrica Forum director Randall 
Robinson began a widely publicized hunger strike in an effort to pressure 
the government to reconsider its lax sanctions and harsh repatriation 
policy.
213
 The Congressional Black Caucus rallied around the Haitian 
crisis, condemning President Clinton’s unconscionable failure to respond 
adequately.
214
 The New York Times published a full-page advertisement 
decrying the government’s meek approach to the violence in Haiti.215 
Signed by ninety-five movie stars, politicians, and activists, the letter 
 
 
 209. POWER, supra note 193, at 377 (quoting ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE 
STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 624–25 (1999)).  
 210. MURPHY, supra note 19, at 260–62. 
 211. Id. at 275–77; see also S.C. Res. 867, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/867 (Sept. 23, 1993). 
 212. See Randall Robinson to Stay on Hunger Strike Until Clinton Changes Policy Toward Haiti, 
JET, May 2, 1994, at 5. 
 213. See id. 
 214. See PHILIPPE R. GIRARD, CLINTON IN HAITI 58, 62–66 (2004). 
 215. See Clarence Page, The Shame of Our Policy on Haiti, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 20, 1994, at A26.  
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proclaimed, “One is left to reasonably conclude that our policy is driven 
by considerations of race.”216 
Amid a firestorm of criticism, the Clinton Administration began to shift 
away from its prior stance of strongly opposing increased protections for 
the migrants and avoiding U.S. involvement on the ground in Haiti. In 
April 1994, Clinton replaced his former Special Envoy for Haiti, who had 
recommended compromising with Cédras, with William H. Gray III, the 
former leader of the Congressional Black Caucus.
217
 The Administration 
aggressively began to pursue strategies to guarantee Aristide’s return to 
the presidency, and it changed its policy toward Haitian migrants to stop 
forced repatriation and to allow shipboard asylum applications.
218
 By the 
following month, the United States had imposed a near-complete trade 
embargo against Haiti and was calling for a tougher U.N. sanctions 
regime, a position it had opposed earlier that same year.
219
 In June, the 
United States stepped up its own sanctions, banning air traffic to Haiti and 
imposing an expanded assets freeze.
220
 Soon, responding to calls by 
domestic communities to restore Aristide by force if necessary, Clinton 
proposed military action, which ultimately was authorized by the United 
Nations in July.
221
 
The circumstances of successful shaming in the case of Haiti can be 
contrasted with the efforts of activists ten years later to convince the U.S. 
government to take action in Darfur. The genocide in Darfur inspired the 
creation of perhaps the most developed domestic American activist 
network in response to any humanitarian crisis.
222
 The community ranged 
from grassroots activists to Washington insiders to Hollywood celebrities, 
 
 
 216. Id. (quoting letter and noting signatures by Quincy Jones, Sigourney Weaver, Robin 
Williams, Spike Lee, Paul Newman, Gregory Peck, and Jesse Jackson, among others); see also 
GIRARD, supra note 214, at 92; John M. Goshko, Groups Call U.S. Haitian Policy a ‘Disaster,’ 
WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1994, at A26.  
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HOPE 187 (2001). 
 218. See DIPRIZIO, supra note 191, at 93. 
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BLACK CAUCUS AND FOREIGN POLICY 37–40 (2003); PAMPHILE, supra note 217, at 186–88; Steven A. 
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1994, at A10 (quoting an anonymous State Department official as saying that the Administration 
adopted all of the basic components of the caucus’s approach to Haiti). 
 221. See S.C. Res. 940, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994); Ann Devroy & R. Jeffrey 
Smith, Debate over Risks Split Administration, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1994, at A1. 
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and they succeeded in penetrating the highest levels of government.
223
 
Despite their vociferous, organized, well-funded efforts to push for 
intervention, however, the United States refused to support military action. 
What explains the resistance of the U.S. government to political 
pressure for intervention in Darfur and its concession to pressure for 
intervention in Haiti? The strategic interests at work were of course 
different at the two times. When the violence in Darfur began to catch the 
attention of the activist community, the United States already was bogged 
down fighting two other wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it treated Sudan 
as an ally in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Similar dynamics, of course, 
did not surround the decision on whether to intervene in Haiti. Still, there 
were geopolitical interests that would seem to have mitigated the role that 
domestic pressure would play in shaping the government’s approach to 
Haiti. For example, at the time of the crisis in Haiti, the United States was 
aware of even greater violence taking place in Rwanda and chose not to 
act; civil war was escalating in Bosnia; and just the previous year, the U.S. 
military intervention in Somalia had turned into a horrific bloodbath, with 
the body of one U.S. Marine dragged through the streets of Mogadishu.
224
 
Beyond facing these numerous foreign-policy crises, with no easy limiting 
principle to explain why U.S. involvement in Haiti should not trigger 
intervention in every mass atrocity around the world, Clinton also was 
attempting during his first term to pursue an ambitious domestic agenda.
225
 
It is this last point that illuminates the significant difference between 
the impact of shame during the Haiti crisis and during the conflict in 
Darfur. Domestic criticism of the government’s Haiti policy came from 
some of Clinton’s most loyal supporters—African-American voters and 
backers who had been critical to Clinton’s successes in gubernatorial 
elections and in his 1992 presidential victory.
226
 After winning the 
presidency, Clinton continued to cultivate his relationship with African-
American constituents and elites. He was the first president to attend every 
dinner of the Congressional Black Caucus, and he regularly invited 
 
 
 223. See Alex de Waal, The Humanitarian Carnival: A Celebrity Vogue, WORLD AFF., Fall 2008, 
at 44, 45. 
 224. See GIRARD, supra note 214, at 40–41. 
 225. Id. at 70. 
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African-American leaders to the White House to consult on issues critical 
to the black community. He needed these leaders and constituents to 
endorse the Administration’s legislative agenda.227 Maintaining their 
support was critical, and maintaining their support required reinstating 
Aristide in the Haitian presidency. Accordingly, efforts to shame the 
President for his inaction proved successful. During the conflict in Darfur, 
in contrast, President Bush did not rely so heavily on the Darfur activist 
community for support. Although Christian conservatives, an important 
constituency for Bush, were calling for greater U.S. involvement to stop 
the genocide, Darfur was merely one issue among many, and activists’ 
demands were largely placated by the Bush Administration’s approach of 
frequently expressing outrage about the violence and pouring money into 
humanitarian aid without doing much more.
228
 More important interests—
especially preserving resources and military capabilities for other ongoing 
wars—thus took precedence over any embarrassment that the U.S. 
government might suffer for its inaction in the crisis.
229
 
While domestic audiences are responsible for much of the shaming 
deployed in the context of humanitarian intervention, foreign audiences 
also seek to shame states. This is increasingly the case given the growth of 
transnational advocacy networks in recent years.
230
 The U.S.-based Darfur 
activist community, for example, lobbied not only the U.S. government, 
but also the Chinese government. A large-scale shaming effort, centered 
on the 2008 Beijing Olympics—renamed the “Genocide Olympics” by 
human rights activists—aimed to highlight China’s role in protecting the 
government of Sudan against Security Council action.
231
 The shaming, 
however, had little impact. Although the Chinese government did 
eventually make some minor concessions,
232
 it persisted in its position that 
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Caucus members for support in economy and crime policies). 
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2007, at A1 (characterizing visit of Darfur refugee camps by a senior Chinese official as a significant 
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the events in Darfur did not warrant coercive foreign action, and it 
continued to hold firm to its opposition to humanitarian intervention.
233
 
Some commentators have suggested that, if a resolution authorizing 
intervention had ever reached a vote in the Council, the Chinese would 
have ultimately abstained,
234
 as they did on some other coercive measures 
toward Sudan.
235
 This reasoning, however, ignores an important indicator 
of the effect of shaming in humanitarian intervention: the subject of the 
shame. 
2. Subject of the Shame 
The norm that forms the basis of the shame strongly affects the 
ultimate effectiveness of the shaming effort. Because shaming involves 
moral condemnation of a target state for failure to adhere to some shared 
norm of conduct, two elements—the notion that the targeted conduct is 
immoral, as well as the assertion that the targeted conduct diverges from a 
community norm—are crucial in yielding effective shaming.236 In the 
context of humanitarian intervention, however, these two elements are 
often missing. 
a. Norms of Responsibility and Intervention  
The norm of conduct most directly at issue in shaming in the context of 
humanitarian intervention is the expectation that the international 
community, through the Security Council, should intervene to prevent or 
stop massive human rights crises. This expectation lies at the root of the 
 
 
 233. But see Shaming China on Darfur, supra note 207 (discussing Chinese intransigence and 
maintaining that “civil society has a chance to shame China into forcing Bashir to stop the genocide in 
Darfur”). 
 234. See, e.g., Current Situation in Darfur, supra note 184, at 30 (suggesting possibility of 
Chinese abstention). 
 235. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5519th mtg. at 4–5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5519 (Aug. 31, 2006) 
(explaining Chinese abstention on Resolution 1706, which expanded the mandate of the United 
Nations Mission in Sudan to include enforcement of the Darfur Peace Agreement); U.N. SCOR, 61st 
Sess., 5423rd mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5423 (Apr. 25, 2006) (statement of representative of China) 
(explaining abstention on Resolution 1672, which imposed targeted sanctions on four Sudanese 
individuals); U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5158 (Mar. 31, 2005) 
(statement of representative of China) (explaining abstention on Resolution 1593, which referred the 
situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court). But see Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to 
Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention, 84 INT’L AFF. 615, 628 (2008) (arguing that 
predictions that China would have been pressured into abstaining are unfounded, as “China’s actual 
performance in the Council suggests that it would be more than willing to use its veto in such cases”). 
 236. See supra Part I.A (defining shaming in international law). 
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responsibility to protect movement
237
 and, more generally, forms the basis 
of calls for more decisive and consistent responses by the Security Council 
to internal conflicts and mass atrocity.
238
 Although the responsibility to 
protect movement and the question of humanitarian intervention are 
among the most talked-about developments in international law and 
politics in recent years, the principle that the Security Council should 
authorize intervention to protect human rights provides, at best, a fragile 
source of shaming. 
Several factors lie at the root of this weakness. First, the notion of a 
responsibility to protect remains a principle with little legal basis.
239
 
International law does impose obligations on states to prevent or respond 
to violations by third parties in some cases, but these arise only in limited 
circumstances.
240
 The broadest basis for such obligations is the 
responsibility of a state for actions that take place in its territory or in 
territory under its control.
241
 By contrast, a state generally has no 
responsibility for the acts of third parties in other states. Because Security 
Council responses to mass atrocity involve authorization of intervention 
by Security Council members in foreign states, this category of state 
responsibility for third-party violations does not provide a legal basis for 
the notion of a responsibility to protect. 
Separate from a state’s responsibility to protect individuals in its 
territory, the Genocide Convention expands bases for liability for a state 
beyond a territorial nexus, but this obligation, too, is restricted. Deciding 
an action alleging Serbia’s responsibility for genocide, the International 
Court of Justice acknowledged that states parties to the Convention are 
 
 
 237. See supra Part II.D (discussing responsibility to protect). 
 238. See MURPHY, supra note 19, at 381; ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 1–5 (2003). 
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hardened into law. See William W. Burke-White, Adoption of the Responsibility to Protect, in THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE PROMISE OF STOPPING MASS ATROCITIES IN OUR TIME 17, 34 
(Jared Genser & Irwin Cotler eds., 2012) (“[N]orms may develop into legal obligations . . . [o]r they 
may remain non-legal, but nonetheless influential understandings that structure the expectations and 
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 240. See Monica Hakimi, State Bystander Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 341, 344 (2010) 
(“No generalized framework exists for appraising when a state must protect against third-party harm or 
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 241. See Gordon A. Christenson, Attributing Acts of Omission to the State, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
312, 323–24 (1991); Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n on the Work of Its Twenty-Sixth Session, May 6–
July 26, 1974, U.N. Doc. A/9610/Rev.1; see also Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 
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a failure to warn ships proceeding through those waters). 
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obligated to “take certain steps to prevent” genocide.242 Nonetheless, it 
constructed this legal duty narrowly, noting that it would be triggered only 
if the state “had the means” to prevent genocide and “manifestly refrained 
from using them.”243 The Court further cautioned that the duty to prevent 
genocide depends on the state’s “capacity to influence effectively the 
action of persons likely to commit, or already committing, genocide,” 
which varies according to factors including the geographical distance 
between the state and the location of the genocide, and the strength of 
political links between the state and the “main actors” in the genocide.244 
Moreover, the Court began its discussion of the duty to prevent genocide 
with a caution that its decision would not “establish a general 
jurisprudence applicable to all cases where a treaty instrument, or other 
binding legal norm, includes an obligation for States to prevent certain 
acts,” and it noted explicitly that it was not addressing the question of 
whether “there is a general obligation on States to prevent the commission 
by other persons or entities of acts contrary to certain norms of general 
international law.”245 Accordingly, although a legal basis for a 
responsibility to protect may be found in some cases with respect to the 
crime of genocide, it does not extend to other crimes, and even the extent 
of the obligations with respect to genocide is contested at this time.
246
 
Because of the absence of general bystander responsibility under 
international law except in cases of territorial authority or a capacity to 
influence the direct perpetrators of genocide, the responsibility to protect 
principle seeks to inculcate an understanding, outside of hard law, that the 
Council has moral, even if not legal, obligations to intervene in mass 
atrocity. The U.N. Secretary-General has voiced this same sentiment, 
reminding the permanent members that the Charter granted them the right 
of veto “[i]n exchange” for an expectation that they would “use their 
power for the common good”247 and “shoulder an extra burden in 
promoting global security.”248 There are two problems with this argument, 
however. First, this is a revision of the original bargain struck at the 
founding of the United Nations. While it is accurate to say that the Charter 
 
 
 242. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & 
Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43 (Feb. 26), ¶ 429. 
 243. Id. ¶ 438. 
 244. Id. ¶ 430. 
 245. Id. ¶ 429. 
 246. See Alex J. Bellamy & Ruben Reike, The Responsibility to Protect and International Law, 2 
GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 267, 276 (2010). 
 247. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 151, at 77. 
 248. Id. ¶ 244. 
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granted the permanent members a veto power in exchange for their 
commitment to take on some additional responsibilities, “maintenance of 
international peace and security” at the time of the Charter’s drafting was 
not understood to encompass authorization for humanitarian intervention 
in internal civil wars and atrocities.
249
 Intervention in the human rights 
abuses taking place in foreign states was not among the responsibilities of 
the Council understood by the drafters of the Charter.
250
 
The second problem is that there is no agreed understanding of the 
common good in this context, and there is no determinate, agreed content 
defining when humanitarian intervention is appropriate and when it is not. 
States disagree widely about whether and when the Security Council 
should intervene at all in foreign human rights crises, and there is even 
greater disagreement about whether or when military intervention to 
protect human rights is appropriate.
251
 Despite celebrations that the 
responsibility to protect triumphed when the Security Council voted to 
authorize intervention in Libya, it is clear that the world has yet to reach 
any consensus that the Security Council has a duty to intervene in 
humanitarian crises.
252
 The massive crisis in Syria shows the extent of 
states’ disagreement on the proper approaches to human rights abuses, 
foreign intervention, and the role of the Security Council in international 
security. After a Russian and Chinese veto destroyed a resolution 
proposing the institution of sanctions against the Assad regime in October 
2011,
253
 the Council dropped the issue of sanctions and has focused 
instead on demanding an end to the government’s campaign of violence 
and expressing support for an Arab League proposal to initiate some 
political process to bring a new government to power.
254
 This second 
 
 
 249. See U.N. Charter art. 24; 1 CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 660 (Bruno 
Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002). 
 250. See MARK MAZOWER, NO ENCHANTED PALACE: THE END OF EMPIRE AND THE 
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 8 (2009) (“One can view the Charter and especailly 
its preamble, along with the UDHR and the GC, as testifing to the foundational imperatives of the new 
world order established in the fight against Nazism. Or one can read them as promissory notes that the 
UN’s founders never intended to be cashed. . . . [S]everal recent critics of the new idealist 
historiography point to the sheer implausibility of trying to trace the roots of our current humanitarian 
activism back to the mid-1940s, when talking about human rights was—for the key policymakers—
often a way of doing nothing and avoiding a serious commitment to intervene.”). 
 251. See Press Release, General Assembly, More Than 40 Delegates Express Strong Skepticism, 
Full Support as General Assembly Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Press Release 
GA/10849 (July 24, 2009). 
 252. See Mohamed, supra note 169, at 326–29. 
 253. See France, Germany, Portugal and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: 
Draft Resolution at 2–3, U.N. Doc. S/2011/612 (Oct. 4, 2011). 
 254. See Bahrain, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, 
Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of 
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resolution garnered the support of nineteen states as cosponsors, including 
eleven in the Middle East and North Africa.
255
 The Arab League has sided 
against the Syrian government and supports U.N. intervention.
256
 The 
weight of international opinion and even of the regional stakeholders 
seems to be against Russia and China. Nonetheless, they have resisted 
calls for a U.N. response to the crisis. Even in the Libya intervention, the 
Security Council cited the principle in its resolution authorizing military 
force only for an assertion that the Libyan government has a responsibility 
to protect its own population; there was no mention of the international 
community’s responsibility to protect individuals in Libya.257 Beyond a 
lack of agreed content on the responsibility to protect, there is a great deal 
of uneasiness about intervention more generally, and states articulate 
strong reasons for supporting the idea that military intervention is not 
always a good idea. 
Moreover, despite the efforts of advocates of humanitarian intervention 
to instill a sense of duty in the members of the Security Council, the 
understanding that the Council has a choice about whether or not it should 
intervene has prevailed. Instead of portraying the Council as a responsible 
party in unaddressed atrocities, popular and academic commentary 
continues to conceive of the Council as a bystander, one step removed 
from the action.
258
 This language predominates even in situations like the 
Rwandan genocide, when the Security Council did not stand by; instead, it 
removed U.N. forces from the area within days of the first massacres.
259
 
To be sure, Council members did not perpetrate violence directly against 
the people of Rwanda, but their decision to nearly eliminate the 
peacekeeping presence from the country may have emboldened the 
 
 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: Draft Resolution at 2–3, U.N. Doc. 
S/2012/77 (Feb. 4, 2012). 
 255. See U.N. SCOR, 67th Sess., 6711th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc S/PV.6711 (Feb. 4, 2012).  
 256. See Liam Stack & Neil MacFarquhar, Arab League Steps Up Pressure on Syria and Calls for 
U.N. Help, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2012, at A9. 
 257. See S.C. Res. 1973, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011); see also Security Council 
6498th Meeting, supra note 11, at 2, 7. 
 258. See, e.g., Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General’s Address to the Commission on Human Rights, 
UNITED NATIONS (Apr. 7, 2004), http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=862 (declaring that “the 
international community cannot stand idle”); Current Situation in Darfur, supra note 184, at 16 
(urging the Committee to “make it politically costly for this administration or any future one to stand 
idly by while atrocities such as those in Darfur are being committed”); David D. Kirkpatrick, Steven 
Erlanger, & Elisabeth Bumiller, Allies Open Air Assault on Qaddafi’s Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 
2011, at A1 (quoting statement by U.S. President Barack Obama that “we can't stand idly by when a 
tyrant tells his people that there will be no mercy”). 
 259. See supra text accompanying notes 17–20. 
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genocidaires.
260
 Indeed, when President Clinton addressed survivors of the 
Rwandan genocide in 1998, he made a rare admission of the close 
connection of the Security Council to the massacres, acknowledging that 
“each bloodletting hastens the next as . . . violence becomes tolerated.”261 
It is thus understandable to conceive of the permanent members who did 
nothing as not merely standing by, but rather as facilitating, emboldening, 
even participating.
262
 
Nonetheless, it is impossible to equate the degree of participation of the 
Security Council with that of the direct perpetrators of atrocity. The sense 
that the Council remains one step removed from the crises in which it does 
or does not intervene is pervasive because it is indeed removed. A Security 
Council that chooses not to become involved, or that chooses to become 
less involved without an intent to further the atrocity, is necessarily 
distinct from an actor that commits atrocities or willfully abets the 
bloodshed. When shaming shifts from a first-order shaming of direct 
perpetrators to a second-order shaming of the powers that can stop it, the 
force of that shaming is diluted.
263
 Even if there was moral condemnation 
to be found in a permanent member’s refusal to support intervention, 
without an intent to facilitate the atrocities being committed, that state can 
insulate itself from condemnation simply by pointing fingers at the real 
perpetrators.
264
 
 
 
 260. See FRED GRÜNFELD & ANKE HUIJBOOM, THE FAILURE TO PREVENT GENOCIDE IN 
RWANDA: THE ROLE OF BYSTANDERS 217 (2007) (asserting that the withdrawal of UNAMIR I 
“facilitated the genocide”); Ervin Staub, The Psychology of Bystanders, Perpetrators, and Heroic 
Helpers, 17 INT’L J. INTERCULTURAL REL. 315, 316 (1993) (asserting that the passivity of bystanders 
“allows perpetrators to see their destructive actions as acceptable and even right”). 
 261. Press Release, Remarks by the President to Genocide Survivors, Assistance Workers, and 
U.S. and Rwanda Government Officials (Mar. 25, 1998), http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/Africa/ 
19980325-16872.html. 
 262. A Netherlands court adopted this characterization in holding the Dutch government 
responsible for the deaths of three individuals who were murdered at Srebrenica. When Bosnian Serbs 
overran the town in July 1995, Serb troops demanded that Dutch U.N. peacekeepers force Bosnian 
Muslim civilians out of the U.N. compound where they had taken refuge. The Dutch forces acceded to 
the Serbs’ demands, and an estimated two hundred individuals who were ejected from the compound 
were among the eight thousand ultimately killed. The Court held that “the State is responsible for the 
death of these men,” as they had already witnessed Bosnian Serbs attacking and killing Bosnian 
Muslim men outside the compound. See Lauren Comiteau, Court Says the Dutch Are to Blame for 
Srebrenica Deaths, TIME (July 6, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2081634,00 
.html; Netherlands Found Liable for 3 Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2011, at A6. 
 263. See supra Part II.E; see also Fernando R. Tesón, The Liberal Case for Humanitarian 
Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 93, 119 
(J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003) (discussing difference between killing and letting 
die). 
 264. Moreover, the sanction that a state may suffer for failing to undertake acceptable conduct in 
the second-order shaming context may be far less threatening than the sanction that would be 
contemplated in the first-order shaming context. While a state directly perpetrating human rights 
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b. Alternative Norms as the Basis for Shaming 
Given that the responsibility to protect principle is neither sufficiently 
strong nor sufficiently shared to generate effective pressure to intervene, it 
is important to consider other norms that may be at work in the context of 
humanitarian intervention.
265
 In particular, a domestic agent of shame may 
add another basis for shaming the target. As discussed above, pressure on 
the Clinton Administration to intervene in Haiti succeeded in motivating 
action in part because Clinton needed the support of the community that 
was condemning his policy.
266
 Beyond the influence of this community, 
the subject of the shame also was significant. Instead of merely identifying 
Clinton as committing a sin of inaction, the activist community 
condemned the inaction as racism.
267
 Tying the Administration’s policies 
in Haiti directly to the treatment of African-Americans in the United 
States, advocates of intervention forced Clinton into a position of having 
to defend against a criticism that threatened his own political survival and, 
in light of the American experience with racism, struck at the soul of the 
nation.
268
 The Administration thus faced an effort aimed to achieve 
shaming both by exploiting fear of political sanctions from the 
Congressional Black Caucus and voters, and by capitalizing on discomfort 
with the projection of an image of the United States as a racist state. A 
strong norm at the basis of the shaming, around which there is consensus 
both on content and on the inappropriateness of violation, thus enables a 
more successful application of shame. 
3. Attention of Alternative Audiences 
Shaming generally consists of an interaction between the agent of 
shame and the target of shame, but in the context of humanitarian 
 
 
abuses against its own people may be the target of military intervention, it seems quite unlikely that a 
state blocking humanitarian intervention, or tolerating abuses by another government, would be 
subject to military intervention as a result. 
 265. This part discusses norms as the basis for shaming states into supporting or tolerating 
intervention, but there are, of course, also norms supporting nonintervention. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 266. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 267. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
 268. Interestingly, it also played into norms important to Clinton himself. Anointed by some 
commentators as the nation’s “first black president,” see, e.g., Toni Morrison, The Talk of the Town, 
THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 5, 1998, available at www.newyorker.com/archive/1998/10/05/1998_10_05_ 
031_TNY_LIBRY_000016504, Clinton must have been profoundly affected by these allegations of 
racism. Under the traditional approach to shaming, we would not consider Clinton’s personal feelings 
as a factor in determining state behavior, but, as discussed above, this may lead us toward an anemic 
understanding of shaming. See supra text accompanying notes 41, 226. 
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intervention, the rest of the world is watching. While the agent of shame 
views the target’s conduct with disapproval, other audiences may approach 
it quite differently. Accordingly, the attention of those alternative 
audiences, which may have commitments to alternative norms, may 
impact the effectiveness of shaming efforts because that attention can 
offset the impact of the initial shaming.
269
 This factor is especially 
instructive in explaining Russian and Chinese responses to American-
supported military interventions. Although many would like to believe that 
a norm of responsibility is what motivated the Chinese and Russian 
abstention in the Security Council decision to authorize military action in 
Libya, they demonstrated no interest in showing their adherence to any 
such norm. Even despite pressure from both within the Council and 
outside of it,
270
 Russia and China issued their abstentions with pronounced 
statements of their strong objections to the Council’s decision. During the 
Security Council meeting on Resolution 1973, the Russian representative 
described the turn to military force to resolve the situation in Libya as 
“most unfortunate and regrettable.”271 The Chinese representative also 
expressed opposition to the Security Council’s decision to authorize 
military action, declaring, “[T]he Security Council should follow . . . the 
norms governing international law, respect the sovereignty, independence, 
unity and territorial integrity of Libya and resolve the current crisis in 
Libya through peaceful means.”272 China abstained on the resolution, the 
representative explained, because the Arab League supported the 
establishment of a no-fly zone.
273
 
In the days after the adoption of the resolution, these abstaining 
permanent members escalated their attacks on the Security Council’s 
decision. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin described the resolution 
as “defective and flawed” and opined that the decision to authorize 
intervention “resembles medieval calls for crusades.”274 The day after the 
Council adopted the resolution, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
 
 269. For an interesting look at the power of “norms and moral duty” in motivating China to act on 
climate change, see Jonathan B. Wiener, Climate Change Policy and Policy Change in China, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 1805, 1812–16 (2008). 
 270. See, e.g., Richard Leiby & Scott Wilson, Arab League Endorses No-Fly Zone Over Libya, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2011, at A01; Press Release, Int’l Crisis Grp., Immediate International Steps 
Needed to Stop Atrocities in Libya (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/ 
media-releases/2011/immediate-international-steps-needed-to-stop-atrocities-in-libya.aspx. 
 271. Security Council 6498th Meeting, supra note 11, at 8. 
 272. Id. at 10. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Gleb Bryanski, Putin Likens U.N. Libya Resolution to Crusade Calls, REUTERS (Mar. 21, 
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/21/us-libya-russia-idUSTRE72K2J220110321. 
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issued a statement that expressed “serious reservations” about the 
resolution and declared unequivocally, “We oppose the use of force in 
international relations.”275 
Acknowledgement of the attention of alternative audiences is crucial to 
understanding why, despite their objections, Russia and China did not 
exercise a veto to stop the Security Council’s authorization of military 
force. The two-track approach of combining vocal objection with 
abstention enabled them to satisfy the many communities to which they 
belong. On the one hand, the expressions of outrage over the intervention 
served to satisfy domestic audiences who opposed intervention. Political 
analysts characterized Putin’s statement, which was delivered to workers 
at a Russian arms factory,
276
 as a gesture to individuals who were likely 
frustrated by the potential for the no-fly zone to compromise Russian arms 
sales to Libya.
277
 Putin thus made this statement “for internal 
consumption” by domestic audiences.278 
The act of abstention, on the other hand, was “for external 
consumption” by states in the region that sought a resolution to the crisis 
in Libya.
279
 Russian and especially Chinese foreign policies have 
prioritized the interests of regional stakeholders in the context of 
humanitarian crises. The Arab League and African Union both voiced 
their support for international intervention in the Libyan conflict, with the 
Arab League for the first time in its history taking a position in the region 
with a people and against a regime,
280
 and issuing a resolution that called 
for imposition of a no-fly zone.
281
 Both Russia and China stated that they 
would defer to the regional stakeholders in their decisions on the 
intervention.
282
 This same concern for the interests of regional 
 
 
 275. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s Remarks on the Adoption of UNSC Resolution 
1973 on the Libya Issue (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.chinaconsulatesf.org/eng/xw/t808091.htm. 
 276. Bryanski, supra note 274; see also Julia Ioffe, Who’s Crusading Now?, FOREIGN POL’Y, 
Mar. 23, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/23/whos_crusading_now. 
 277. See Ioffe, supra note 276. 
 278. Id. (quoting comments of Masha Lipman, analyst with the Carnegie Moscow Center); see 
also Alexandra Guisinger & Alastair Smith, Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and 
Political Institutions in International Crises, 46 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 175, 180 (2002); Jessica L. 
Weeks, Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve, 62 INT’L ORG. 35 (2008) 
(arguing that nondemocracies also face threats to their power). 
 279. See Ioffe, supra note 276. 
 280. See Catherine Powell, Libya: A Multilateral Constitutional Moment?, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 
298, 313–14 (2012). 
 281. Ethan Bronner & David E. Sanger, Arab League Endorses No-Flight Zone Over Libya, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2011, at A1; see also Annex to the letter dated Mar. 14, 2011 from the Permanent 
Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations to the United Nations addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/2011/137 (Mar. 15, 2011).  
 282. See Security Council 6498th Meeting, supra note 11, at 8, 10. 
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governments has guided decisions in this area since the early 1990s. For 
example, when permanent members put the Somali civil war on the 
Council’s agenda, African states were initially cautious about the move 
and did not support intervention. During early discussions, China indicated 
that it would abstain on any action authorizing military intervention in 
Somalia because of the reservations of African states.
283
 Once those 
governments came out in support of intervention, however, China instead 
voted in favor of the resolution authorizing intervention because of its 
deference to the African states’ position.284 
In the context of humanitarian intervention, this deference to regional 
stakeholders appears to be the only consideration that overrides the 
Russian and Chinese governments’ governing principle of nonintervention 
in the internal affairs of states. Although commitment to the 
nonintervention principle is often characterized as pretext or mere 
contrarianism,
285
 it has deep roots. As Robert Legvold describes, “the very 
thought of outsiders setting aside the safeguard of state sovereignty to 
intrude in domestic events—no matter how ugly—rouses deep historical 
reflexes” for Russia and China.286 Both countries bitterly remember the 
indignity of intervention by foreign states in their own territories.
287
 Both 
also fear the contemporary implications of humanitarian intervention. In 
forming approaches to humanitarian intervention, it would be 
unimaginable for China to ignore the possibility of foreign powers 
intervening to support separatist movements in Tibet and Xinjiang, and 
Russia—no stranger to undertaking military action in foreign countries—
surely is considering the prospect for intervention in Chechnya or 
 
 
 283. China indicated that it would abstain rather than veto because its deference to the principle of 
nonintervention in the internal affairs of states did not apply in this case, as there was no functioning 
government in Somalia. See WHEELER, supra note 14, at 187. 
 284. See Martin Walker & Mark Tran, UN Votes to Send Troops to Somalia, GUARDIAN 
(London), Dec. 4, 1992, at 1; see also WHEELER, supra note 14, at 186; Powell, supra note 280, at 314 
(describing the “central way that . . . international and regional organizations working in tandem . . . 
shaped states’ perceptions of their identities and interests, and ultimately of the norms that they were 
willing to accept” in the Libyan crisis). 
 285. But see, e.g., Kathrin Hille & Michael Peel, China Takes More Nuanced Stance on Syria, 
FIN. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4b772dca-5d64-11e1-869d-00144feabdc0.html 
#axzz2IIYMncPy. 
 286. See Robert Legvold, Foreword, in 2 PUGWASH OCCASIONAL PAPERS: STUDY GROUP ON 
INTERVENTION, SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (Jeffrey Boutwell ed., 2001) 
[hereinafter INTERVENTION, SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY]. 
 287. See Vladimir Baranovsky, Humanitarian Intervention: Russian Perspectives, in 
INTERVENTION, SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, supra note 286. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/3
  
 
 
 
 
2013] SHAME IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL 1247 
 
 
 
 
Georgia.
288
 This concern for nonintervention, then, is both a matter of 
identity and interests—a reflection of national history, culture, and local 
preferences, as well as a way to erect protective barriers against intrusion 
in national affairs in the future.
289
  
The commitment to nonintervention is also crucial to Russian and 
Chinese relations with the nonaligned movement (“NAM”), the group of 
states representing the developing world in the United Nations.
290
 China 
especially has cultivated a position of closeness and trust with the NAM, 
and in recent years, Russia has become more connected to the movement 
as well.
291
 The NAM typically objects to foreign intervention in the 
internal affairs of any state unless the state consents to it,
292
 and Russia 
and China generally voice similar positions unless regional stakeholders 
demand otherwise.
293
 For example, even while China endured significant 
criticism for its opposition to humanitarian intervention in Darfur, the 
position of the NAM provided important political cover. Condemnation by 
human rights activists—even when they threatened China’s successful 
hosting of the Olympic Games—meant little when it was counteracted by 
support from the African Union, Arab League, and Organization of 
Islamic Conference.
294
 Thus, a multiplicity of audiences enables a state to 
shake off criticism by one audience when it can generate support within 
another audience with that same behavior. In the context of humanitarian 
intervention, the deep contestation over norms of intervention and 
nonintervention makes the impact of alternative audiences even more 
 
 
 288. See Jean Krasno & Mitushi Das, The Uniting for Peace Resolution and Other Ways of 
Circumventing the Authority of the Security Council, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE 
POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY 173, 190 (Bruce Cronin & Ian Hurd eds., 2008). 
 289. See supra note 278 and accompanying text (discussing attention by autocratic governments 
to domestic population’s preferences). 
 290. See K.J. Grieb, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS 310, 311 (John Allphin Moore, Jr. & Jerry Pubantz eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
 291. See Alexander Orlov, The Non-Aligned Movement: 40 Years After, 48 INT’L AFF. 49, 55 
(2002). 
 292. See Grieb, supra note 290, at 311. 
 293. See supra notes 283–84 and accompanying text. The consent exception also explains China’s 
and Russia’s acceptance of U.N. intervention in Haiti, as the Aristide regime—thought to be still the 
legitimate government after the coup—requested intervention. Russia and China may have been 
influenced by their views on consent in the Libya intervention as well, as Libya’s UN ambassador was 
urging the Security Council at least to impose sanctions against Qaddafi. See Bill Chappell, Libyan 
Ambassador Denounces Gadhafi at U.N., NPR (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/ 
2011/02/25/134069630/libyan-ambassador-denounces-gadhafi-at-u-n.  
 294. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 7, at 641 (recognizing role of “back-patting” in 
influencing state behavior); see also Michael G. Mackinnon, The United Nations Security Council, in 
THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF MASS ATROCITIES: THE CASE OF DARFUR, supra note 199, at 71, 
89–90. 
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salient, as different audiences are more likely to have different opinions on 
the conduct at issue. While Security Council members or human rights 
activists might pressure resisting states to acquiesce in humanitarian 
intervention, domestic publics or other foreign audiences neutralize that 
shaming by insisting on heartier opposition to what they perceive as self-
interested adventurism or even a potential threat to future national 
stability.  
4. Repeated Interactions Within the Security Council 
Shaming cannot be understood in this context without recognizing the 
role of the repeated interactions of the Council. The states of the U.N. 
Security Council are individual actors, but the permanent members 
participate consistently in a collective institution, one that has shaped their 
place in the world for more than sixty-five years. This institution is under 
threat from reformers who seek to dismantle it and to remove the 
permanent members from their positions of impenetrable power.
295
 It is 
thus in the interest of the individual states to protect the institution. This 
might explain why the permanent members aim to mitigate the shame that 
targets even their opponents within the Council. This dynamic is evinced 
by the rhetoric that permanent members often use when a veto thwarts 
collective action. Instead of pointing fingers at the vetoing state, 
condemning its obstruction of global cooperation as Herbert Evatt would 
have hoped, in many cases they instead take collective responsibility for 
the failure of the institution as a whole. When China and Russia vetoed a 
resolution calling on the government of Myanmar to cease attacks against 
civilians, for example, outside commenters vilified their immoral support 
of the murderous regime.
296
 Inside the Council, in contrast, the United 
States and United Kingdom, the sponsors of the resolution, merely 
expressed their “disappoint[ment]” at “the failure of the Council.”297 This 
 
 
 295. See FASSBENDER, supra note 126, at 7–19. 
 296. See Evelyn Leopold, China, Russia Cast Rare Veto Against U.S. on Myanmar, REUTERS 
(Jan. 12, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/01/13/us-myanmar-un-idUSN1148874520070 
113; Rosemary Righter, Brazen China Strings Along Burmese Pearl, AUSTRALIAN TIMES, Oct. 2, 
2007, at 11. 
 297. U.N. SCOR, 62d Sess., 5619th mtg. at 6–7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5619 (Jan. 12, 2007) [hereinafter 
Security Council 5619th Meeting]. For similar incidents, see, for example, Security Council 6627th 
Meeting, supra note 23, at 5 (statement of representative of Portugal) (expressing, after veto by Russia 
and China, “deep[] regret that the Security Council was unable to unanimously and unequivocally 
condemn, and demand an immediate end to, the Syrian Government’s violent repression against its 
population”); id. at 10 (statement of representative of Germany) (“Today the Council failed to live up 
to its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations . . . .”); U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6484th 
mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6484 (Feb. 18, 2011) (statements of representatives of Russia and China) 
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failure was attributed not to Russia and China, but instead to the 
organization as a whole. 
This collective understanding of the failures of the Council undercuts 
the impact of any shaming effort that is targeted against individual states. 
Governments blocking collective action can insulate their own 
obstructions with language of collective failure, and the states that push 
for intervention are incentivized to minimize the extent of these 
breakdowns because of their reflection on the institution as a whole.
298
 
Indeed, after acknowledging the Council’s failure, delegations typically 
turn to alternatives to concerted action, downplaying the impact of the 
Council’s inability to act instead of focusing attention on the vetoing 
party’s transgressions. 
Moreover, the fact that permanent members have repeated interactions 
means that opportunities both for violation and for vindication are always 
on the horizon. The prospects for cooperation in the future—which, for 
example, motivated the United States to limit its shaming of China during 
the Darfur crisis—deter states from too heartily voicing condemnation of 
those that may soon be partners. Further, given the propensity of the 
United States to use the veto power in what many observers view as an 
inappropriate manner,
299
 Washington is wise to be careful in how often or 
how intensely it criticizes the same practice of inappropriate veto by 
Russia or China. Some have exalted shaming in the criminal law for its 
“deeply democratic” character—that is, the fact that shaming is a 
punishment rooted in condemnation by one’s peers.300 But the deeply 
democratic nature of shaming in international law is also one of its great 
 
 
(noting that “the draft resolution was not adopted” without attributing that failure to the United States, 
which vetoed the measure); U.N. SCOR, 63d Sess., 5933d mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 5933 (July 11, 
2008) (statement of representative of the United Kingdom) (opining, following veto by Russia and 
China of resolution calling for sanctions against Zimbabwe’s president, that “the Security Council has 
failed to shoulder its responsibility to do what it can to prevent a national tragedy deepening and 
spreading its effects across Southern Africa”); Security Council 5619th Meeting, supra, at 9 (statement 
of representative of France) (expressing, after veto by Russia and China, “regret that the Security 
Council was not able to adopt” a resolution calling for a cessation to attacks against civilians by 
government of Myanmar); U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5051st mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5051 (Oct. 5, 
2004) (statement of representative of Algeria) (attributing demise of resolution demanding end to 
Israeli military activities in Northern Gaza to a “fail[ure]” by the Council, rather than to a veto by the 
United States). 
 298. Cf. Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute 
Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (2002) (explaining that two states participating in a 
treaty may choose not to adopt a dispute resolution clause because mechanisms may impose costs on 
one of the parties that are not offset by any gain by the other party). 
 299. See WOUTERS & RUYS, supra note 76, at 15. 
 300. Amitai Etzioni, Back to the Pillory?, AM. SCHOLAR, Summer 1999, at 43, 47. 
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difficulties: in many cases, the shamers are no different from the 
shamed.
301
 
C. Implications 
Because of the limited time period and narrow set of cases from which 
humanitarian intervention in the Security Council can be examined, it 
would be unwise to make sweeping conclusions about the operation of 
shame in motivating permanent members.
302
 Nonetheless, the four 
dynamics defined here facilitate a more systematized understanding and 
allow the creation of a basic narrative of the mechanism of shame in the 
context of humanitarian intervention. The United States usually acts as an 
instigator of intervention, either of its own volition (and often in 
coordination with allies) or in response to pressure by a mobilized 
community with particular political influence. Once the United States is 
seized of a situation, Russia and China are active either in blocking, 
threatening to block, or in tolerating humanitarian intervention. Which 
approach they take depends in large part on the position of regional 
stakeholders; if regional stakeholders support intervention, this will sway 
Russia and China to deviate from their default position of nonintervention 
in the internal affairs of states.
303
 These repeated interactions further 
motivate all states in the Council to seek to lessen the impact of shaming 
from the outside. 
Beyond illuminating the factors that explain how shaming operates in 
the context of humanitarian intervention, this examination of the dynamics 
of shame has several important implications. First, this study should guide 
the efforts of parties seeking to influence permanent members, as efforts to 
shame are likely to be fruitless when they are based merely on an 
expectation that the U.N. Security Council should act in humanitarian 
crises. Unless that expectation ripens into a norm that is seen to be of 
central importance to the United States, China, or Russia—a development 
that seems quite unlikely at this point—it will remain merely an argument 
 
 
 301. Cf. NUSSBAUM, supra note 39, at 235 (arguing that this “deeply democratic” nature is 
problematic because “[w]hen government invites the mob to punish, it can expect targeting of people 
who are regarded as unsavory, even if they have done nothing, or nothing much, wrong”). 
 302. Indeed, some argue that “[t]here is no such thing as Security Council jurisprudence” and that 
“the lessons learned from the first case usually wear off after the second.” Peter van Walsum, The 
Security Council and the Use of Force: The Cases of Kosovo, East Timor, and Iraq, in THE SECURITY 
COUNCIL AND THE USE OF FORCE: THEORY AND REALITY—A NEED FOR CHANGE? 65, 65 (Niels 
Blokker & Nico Schrijver eds., 2005). 
 303. See supra note 293 and accompanying text. 
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used to justify intervention that is already supported rather than a tool for 
advocates of intervention to wield influence.
304
 Actors seeking to 
successfully mobilize shame should acknowledge that the positions of 
regional stakeholders are key to the reactions of China and Russia to 
humanitarian intervention. Commentators portray Russian and Chinese 
resistance to intervention as an arbitrary attempt to obstruct U.S. interests 
or as a self-interested measure to protect against outside intervention,
305
 
but past practice shows that this is a matter of national identity and 
continued support from their key partners in foreign policy.
306
 Finally, it is 
crucial to recognize that pressure from domestic audiences within the 
United States typically does not convince the government to support 
humanitarian intervention. While the president has sought public support 
for planned interventions, it has yielded to public pressure on whether to 
pursue those interventions only when that pressure comes from powerful 
constituencies.
307
 
Advocates of shaming thus should recognize that it is only in limited 
circumstances that shaming ultimately succeeds in influencing the 
behavior of states in the context of humanitarian intervention. This 
suggests that instead of seeking to blindly criticize the governments that 
fail to take action or that seek to block action by others, advocates should 
focus more on building the necessary conditions for shaming: reaching 
constituencies with some influence—whether powerful legislators in the 
United States or other governments in the region of the humanitarian 
crisis—or securing the consent of governments facing intervention so as to 
cure the Russian and Chinese resistance to nonintervention. In past 
interventions, criticism has been meaningless without some other 
connection to the core interests of the governing regime. 
These particular dynamics inspire three broader conclusions. First, the 
dynamics of shame in the Security Council raise questions about whether 
shaming based on the notion of a responsibility to protect yields 
productive results. Much ink has been spilled over whether the 
responsibility to protect is or is not law, but a more pertinent inquiry may 
be whether it is affecting state behavior, and in what way, whether or not it 
is law. Because moral condemnation forms the basis of shaming, this tool 
works best when it targets actions that cannot be justified. It is clear that 
massacres of innocent people—the first-order subject of shame—cannot 
 
 
 304. See Sunstein, supra note 55, at 914. 
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be convincingly justified by their perpetrators. But the second-order 
subject of shame—a failure or refusal of the Security Council to authorize 
intervention—is so contested that shaming based on this notion of 
responsibility has largely failed to produce results. Questions about 
whether humanitarian intervention is a good way to respond to mass 
atrocity, about what constitutes a sufficiently serious crisis as to warrant 
intervention, and about what steps ought to be taken in order to avoid 
military intervention remain heartily contested in the chambers of the 
United Nations and in the debates of governments and civil society. As a 
result, shaming based on a responsibility to protect invites the target of the 
shame to offer justifications and explanations for its opposition to 
intervention. The act of shaming thus creates a new site of contestation 
over the principle of a responsibility to protect; every time Russia or China 
or any other state is made to answer to criticism it faces, that state is given 
an opportunity to further its arguments opposing any norm of intervention. 
Accordingly, while shaming may operate to reinforce norms in some 
cases, in the context of humanitarian intervention the principle of a 
responsibility to intervene remains so contested and contingent that 
shaming instead may lead to further deterioration of the already-contested 
principle. 
Second, the dynamics of shame in the Security Council suggest that the 
deontological focus of the contemporary human rights movement may 
contribute to the movement’s weaknesses. Rights talk today often consists 
of expressing a need to protect rights because they are fundamental, 
because they are undeniable, because they are rights. Consequentialism 
played a role in the first international human rights instruments; the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, expresses that the 
declaration is necessary not simply because human rights are fundamental, 
but rather because human rights violations lead to war and because respect 
for human rights can enable social progress and better standards of 
living.
308
 The U.N. Charter, too, characterizes the protection of human 
rights as a way to create “conditions of stability and well-being which are 
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations.”309 This 
consequentialist understanding of rights, however, has faded away over 
the years, with the useful benefits of protecting rights taking a back seat to 
the transcendent idea that rights are fundamental and therefore must be 
 
 
 308. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, pmbl., U.N. Doc. 
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protected.
310
 This study of shaming efforts indicates that the fundamental 
nature of rights is simply not enough to move the most powerful states in 
the world to action. They have made some difference; given the reaction 
of some states to the possibility of an atrocity in Libya, for example, it 
seems unlikely that the world would react to an event like the Rwandan 
genocide today in the way that it did in 1994. State preferences have 
changed in some ways, but this is limited, and it is difficult to conclude 
even despite these changes that states now see intervention as simply the 
right thing to do. State interests, however—a need to protect relationships 
with domestic constituencies or with other states—do succeed in 
motivating action.
311
 Scholars and advocates in human rights may fear the 
impurity of consequentialist approaches to rights; to focus on politics as a 
reason for protecting individuals from massive human rights violations 
seems to cheapen the content of those rights, whereas a moral duty to 
protect and respect human rights regardless of the consequences aligns 
better with the respect that should be given to their inviolable and 
fundamental nature. This discomfort with admitting the consequentialist 
rationales for protecting human rights, however, may prove to be a 
disservice to the human rights advocates seeking to inspire intervention, 
whether military or otherwise. Consequentialist rationales for rights 
protection may instead constitute the more effective approach. 
Third, this analysis suggests that the lofty expectations of the promise 
of shaming run into very high barriers in the context of humanitarian 
intervention. This should be expected. The warm blanket of the term 
“humanitarian intervention” obscures the fact that humanitarian 
intervention, despite the euphemism, is war. It is costly; it is destructive; 
tanks and schools and churches and factories are blown to pieces; soldiers 
and sisters and brothers and children die cruel and ugly deaths. 
Humanitarian intervention may be the point at which the power of 
humanitarianism runs out. Interests in protecting relationships with allies 
or political constituencies may carry the day in convincing a state to 
tolerate or support intervention, but without that threat of harmful 
 
 
 310. See BRIAN OREND, HUMAN RIGHTS: CONCEPT AND CONTEXT 89 (2002); WILLIAM J. 
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consequences, shame will have little effect. The decision to intervene in 
Libya was not a triumph of shame in the Security Council, as many would 
like it to be; it was instead an exposure of the tool’s limited power. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has demonstrated that moral condemnation of states for 
their failure to support or tolerate humanitarian intervention faces 
significant challenges in motivating the desired impact. The limited 
influence of the agent of shame, the absence of a norm of intervention, the 
attention and divergent interests of competing audiences, and the repeated 
interactions of the members of the Security Council prevent shaming—
which can be effective in other areas of human rights protection—from 
securing Security Council support for intervention in humanitarian crises. 
Accordingly, proponents of a responsibility to protect or of humanitarian 
intervention—or of any movement that seeks to convince powerful states 
to use coercive tools to end human rights abuses by other states—should 
turn away from blindly seeking to mobilize shame. This may mean more 
carefully tailoring efforts to generate conditions that will enhance the 
effect of condemnation on Security Council members. This approach, 
however, ignores the high barriers to influencing states in the area of 
warmaking, the power that governments most cautiously protect. Turning 
to alternatives to military intervention may thus provide a more auspicious 
solution, one that not only may provoke less opposition from the 
governments in the Security Council, but also may prove a more 
promising and less destructive road for rights protection in the long run. 
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